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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

RAYMOND ARON VIEWS U.S., SOVIET NUCLEAR BALANCE, STRATEGY

Paris COMMENTAIRE in French No 5, 1979 pp 3-14

[Article by Raymond Aron: "From American Imperialism to Soviet Hegemonism"]

[Text] Some 30 years ago, the professor of international relations and the man in the street pictured the world in about the same way. The professor used scholarly terms to describe the system of relations between states as a "bipolar" system. The man in the street's picture focused on the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, not without underestimating the overall economic and military superiority of the maritime power, the American republic, a superiority over the Euro-Asian land mass comparable to Great Britain's former superiority over Europe. And it was only 20 years ago that mankind was terrified and held its breath when Krushchev issued his quasi-ultimatum on Berlin (1958), and again a few years later (1962) during the [Cuban] missile crisis.

Today, professors and the man in the street probably agree, but no longer on any one picture of the world. If anything, they would both consider the world too difficult to picture clearly because of its sheer complexity. Should the Moscow-Peking-Washington triangle replace the Moscow-Washington duel? Which of the duelists now has military supremacy? Does the East-West conflict still have the global significance we attributed to it until about the early 1960's?

Admittedly the United States and the Soviet Union continue to merit the distinctive position they have assumed, a position which observers admit they have. They are the only nations possessing a complete arsenal on land and sea, in air and space, from submachine guns to megaton bombs. They alone have the capability of projecting their military strength to any point on the globe. They alone have participated in the conquest of space. What is more, from now until the end of the century they will essentially retain this duopoly, regardless of what progress the People's Republic of China may make during the next 20 years.

Why do we have a blurred picture of the world instead of the unduly simple structure of the cold war? Keeping to the essential points, here, in my view, are the major reasons:

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1. The confusion in distinguishing between the Soviet Union and Marxism-Leninism which transfigured a great power rivalry into ideological warfare now belongs to the past: the so-called socialist bloc has shattered into fragments. The PRC denounces Soviet "hegemonism" as the number-one enemy. In the absence of Moscow, the intelligentsia could dream of a real Mecca in Belgrade or Havana, with Tito or Fidel Castro against the Stalinist or capitalist Goliath. How can one possibly choose between North Vietnam's quasi-Stalinism and Kampuchea's quasi-genocide? China supports Phnom Penh because Moscow supports Hanoi. Once in power, communist parties revive their nations' historic quarrels.

It would be too simple to eliminate the ideological dimension and return to the chess games of diplomacy. In Asia, both empires, Russian and Chinese, have elevated the same ideology to a "truth of state." They accuse each other of betraying that truth. In so doing, they have stripped their maneuvers, alliances, and hostilities of all ideological garb: pure and naked power politics has thus emerged from the terminology that once disguised it, and both powers are now unmasking each other.

Elsewhere, it is an altogether different story. The victory of a progressive or Marxist-Leninist party does not necessarily result in that country's alinement with the Soviet bloc, although it frequently does. Even in the absence of such alinement, the new regime that professes to be socialist conducts a different brand of diplomacy than the moderate or pro-Western regime it overthrew. Entry of the communist party into the government of Paris or Rome would be an event fraught with unpredictable international consequences: any extreme interpretation--i.e. a disaster or a brief episode--would be mentally satisfying but would present the real facts in a wrong light.

2. The Russian-American relationship itself has become ambiguous, equivocal. Does it approximate a condominium or a life and death struggle? Are the two superpowers playing out their dispute little by little or are they concealing it? In the final analysis, the SALT accords are based on mutual distrust. H. Kissinger hoped to conclude partial agreements with Moscow, a sort of network that would confine, as it were, the revolutionary or ex-revolutionary power.

Did he succeed or fail? Has Brezhnev's Russia become, as G.F. Kennan claims, a conservative power from which the United States or our allies no longer have anything to fear? Or else is it, as dissidents maintain, still the same, in other words, cautious but always ready to seize any opportunity to extend its sphere of influence or domination, more ambitious than in Stalin's time because it now has the resources to be such, more normal internally because the gerontocracy, survivor of so many earth-shaking events, has routinized its rule and despotism?

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Containment was the watchword or inspiration for the bipartisan diplomacy of the United States. There is no longer a bipartisan diplomacy on the other side of the Atlantic. On all issues--the "Chinese card," SALT agreements, African action, and defense budget--the intellectuals of the Eastern establishment, Republicans and Democrats, who conceived and supported the postwar bipartisan policy are now divided, and sometimes to such a point that yesterday's friends no longer speak to each other.

3. The two superpowers have not lost their military supremacy, but what are they doing with it? What can they do with it? Is inactive force real force? In 1950-53, the United States was not victorious over North Korea, that half of a country saved by the intervention of "volunteers," in other words, regular PRC troops. The United States was defeated by North Vietnam, another half country, defeated in the sense that North Vietnam achieved its goals without, however, having thereby defeated the U.S. expeditionary force. Did the Soviet Union need 40,000 tanks to quell the Hungarian revolt? To bring to heel, in Prague, Marxist-Leninists who were dreaming of a type of socialism with a human face?

Diplomats with less cynicism than Stalin--"the Pope, how many divisions does he have?"--never forgot, in their negotiations and calculations, how many men under arms each ambassador represented. Today, the number of special embassy counselors--cultural, scientific, commercial, public affairs--symbolizes total diplomacy, illustrates the new dimensions of diplomacy.

4. These conditions give rise, therefore, to one major question: Where does the essential element of relations between states lie? On the one hand, it lies in the accumulation of weapons and the technical advances made in nuclear and nonnuclear weapons; on the other, in national economies operating within a world market. For the first time in history, as historians have pointed out, a world market does not extend and operate inside a world empire. European industry depends on oil from the Persian Gulf. National or multinational firms obtain necessary parts for their machinery from countries where wages are low. Our relations with our partners in the European Community, with the oil-producing countries, with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe involve commercial exchanges primarily, and intellectual or artistic exchanges secondarily. Socialist countries do not fully belong to the empire of merchants, but they are linked to it by their recourse to private bank loans with which to finance purchases in the West.

A world society, so to speak, consists of a set of complex international and transnational relations as much as or more than traditional diplomatic-strategic relations. Ideas or news reports cross borders and go around the world in a few minutes. Technical innovations and scientific discoveries are disseminated with increasing rapidity. In this transnational society, states no longer always play the leading role.

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All of this accounts for the diversity of images from which professors of international relations hesitate to choose any one picture. Which one of them corresponds most to current reality? I do not propose to discuss, in the abstract, the respective merits of these pictures that are probably more complementary than incompatible. I shall take as my starting point the distinction between the system of relations between states, a system governed by the ratio of forces, and the world society over which no one actor exercises sovereign rule. I shall also discuss the respective positions of the United States and the Soviet Union within this system of relations and this world society. Does the relative decline of the United States mark the passage from American imperialism to Soviet hegemonism?

Arms and Diplomacy

Russian-American rivalry assumed two altogether different forms, one in Europe, the other in the rest of the world. Here in Europe, two coalitions gradually took shape, from 1947 to 1955, on both sides of the demarcation line: the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic Alliance. Borders did not change and neither of the two coalitions resorted to military action to alter them. In Asia and the Middle East, these two superpowers acted behind the scenes, if not on the scene, but their troops never clashed directly on the battlefield.

The two limited wars in which the United States committed an expeditionary force both had an accidental character. Stalin would probably not have given Kim Il-song the green light if Washington's diplomats had let it be clearly known in advance that the United States would not tolerate the invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops. Hostilities would not have continued for 3 years if Truman had heeded the Chinese warnings India's ambassador had relayed to him. Likewise, the United States, opposed to the return of the French to Indochina, reversed its attitude as a result of Mao Tse-Tung's victory in China. After the Geneva Conference, the United States did not have to perpetuate a Korean-type situation in Vietnam under conditions far more unfavorable than in Korea: unlike the South Korean armed forces, the South Vietnamese armed forces did not counterbalance the troops mobilized by the other half of the country.

Leaving these two limited wars aside, the system of relations between states changed as a result of decolonization, internal uprisings, and shifts of allegiance from one bloc to the other. The United States or the Soviet Union intervened in the internal politics of countries and between countries, but under juridical camouflage that was impeccable more often than not. The United Nations Charter does not prohibit a country from buying arms on the outside or from requesting aid from another country. The United States and the Soviet Union have responded to this type of request, and they have withdrawn their advisers and troops whenever the local government has called upon them to do so. President Sadat obtained the withdrawal of Soviet advisers. Ethiopia's revolutionary regime also obtained the departure of most American diplomats and military personnel.

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At times, the legal cover did not withstand close examination. The French-British expedition in answer to nationalization of the Suez Canal failed for multiple reasons. It would have succeeded only if it had caused Nasser's overthrow and the immediate arrival of another president. Encouraged by the Soviet ambassador and the position taken by the United States, Nasser stood fast. The English pound was unable to withstand the turmoil, and the French-British troops ingloriously withdrew. At the same time, Soviet troops put down the Hungarian revolution, at the request of the peasant-worker government headed by Janos Kadar. The juridical camouflage for this Soviet action was scarcely more valid than the pretext the French and British used for occupying the Canal Zone in order to separate the Israeli and Egyptian belligerents. In 1968, the Kremlin improved the image of its military intervention by associating its Warsaw Pact allies in the operation. Except for the crises of 1956 and 1968, the superpowers intervened in the internal affairs of other countries without expressly violating international law: overt intervention by furnishing arms or advisers, covert intervention in an effort to destabilize a regime by supporting its opposition or rebellious ethnic minorities. From this standpoint, it can be said that gunboat diplomacy has gone out of style.

In the Middle East, Israel and the Arab countries have waged four wars--1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 (omitting the 1970 war of attrition)--ended by cease-fires and never a peace treaty. In 1956, France and Great Britain participated in the operations. Since then, they have been kept out of the negotiations in crisis situations. Not because of their role in 1956, but for a simpler reason. When countries wage wars against each other, the only other countries they will listen to are those capable of mobilizing forces in the theater of operations. In 1956, 1967 and 1973, the Russian-American negotiations, conducted in the background of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, influenced the duration of the hostilities and the terms and conditions of the cease-fire. Russians and Americans refrained from any direct participation in the fighting, thus enabling the Israelis to win victories in the field. In 1973, however, the Russians first, and then the Americans, resupplied their respective proteges during the fighting. And they hastened the declaration of a cease-fire in order to save an Egyptian army surrounded in the desert.

In a similar crisis when the Kremlin seemed to be about to dispatch airborne divisions to the Middle East, what ratio of forces determined the outcome of the test of wills? Was it the ratio of forces available in the theater, in other words, the American Sixth Fleet, the Soviet fleet in the eastern Mediterranean, and the aircraft squadrons operating from land bases? Or else was it the ratio of all Russian and American forces, nuclear and conventional, throughout the globe? I do not think anyone, not even H. Kissinger or R. Nixon, can answer this question with any certainty. Officials in the Kremlin did not wish to take the risk of committing their troops against the Israelis. They did not want to tolerate a total Israeli victory. For his part, H. Kissinger wanted to spare Egypt a defeat that would have prohibited Sadat from pursuing a policy of peace. Once a Syrian-Egyptian victory was ruled out, both the Russians and the Americans wanted

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essentially the same end to the conflict. Both parties did, nevertheless, calculate the ratio of forces, regional or worldwide. They avoided confrontation and tacitly accepted the verdict of the battlefield (a verdict gained by others).

Whether it be in Ethiopia, South Yemen, Afghanistan, Mozambique, or Angola, have Soviet advances been connected in some way with the relative number of nuclear warheads on American and Russian silo-launched or submarine-launched missiles? Or with the number of tanks or fighter squadrons on each side of the demarcation line in Europe? On the surface, the question answers itself, so to speak. The liberation movement in Mozambique upheld Marxist or progressive ideas. It was not in Moscow but in our European universities that Africa's liberators learned their ideology. A progressive movement won in Angola because the U.S. Congress refused to appropriate the funds needed to support the nonprogressive liberation movement. The ratio of forces between the various parties inside Ethiopia and Angola does not depend on the overall ratio of forces between the Soviet Union and the United States, but on the respective capability or willingness of Westerners and Soviets to help their party.

The apparent separation between the ratio of local forces and the ratio of global forces of the two superpowers is never a complete one. The interventions in Africa by Cuban troops presupposed the existence in the Soviet bloc of transport aircraft, a series of air bases, and perhaps even airborne divisions should they be needed. In the Middle East, the Kremlin tolerated the Israeli victory in 1967 and was reluctant to employ its airborne divisions in 1973 because of U.S. power as much as because of regional circumstances. In the Cuban crisis in the fall of 1962, all the advantages were on the American side: locally, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force had overwhelming superiority; likewise U.S. strategic nuclear weapons were three or four times more powerful than those of the Soviet Union.

How can anyone accurately determine the relative part played in settling a crisis by conventional weapons in the theater of operations and nuclear weapons?

The best approach is to stick to prudent conclusions. The central balance, the one encompassing both Europe and the strategic weapons of the two superpowers, does exercise an influence over crises and over diplomatic confrontations and their outcome when armies face each other or when recourse to arms by the superpowers appears probable or at least plausible. On the other hand, whenever Russian-American rivalry extends inside countries, the ratio of global forces exercises only a very indirect influence on the protagonists. Nothing succeeds as much as success. Whenever the wind from the East seems to get the better of the wind from the West, progressivism's arguments thereby become more convincing. And the ratio of global forces between the United States and the Soviet Union has been changing year by year in favor of the latter.

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Arms Control

The Soviet Union has always maintained a considerably large military establishment. A comparison between, for example, the number of Soviet and American tanks--50,000 versus 10,000--is enough to give the impression that Moscow now surpasses Washington. We could easily add many other such statistics. For instance, the Soviet Union's military budget increases 3 to 5 percent annually, and represents some 13 percent, perhaps even 15 percent, of the USSR's gross national product, a percentage triple that of the United States (5 percent). Even in the nuclear weapons field, the Soviets are the ones who have made the most progress. They have deployed two new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) systems, and three land-based missile systems. The Americans have deployed only one new SLBM system, the Trident, have MIRVed their Minuteman and Poseidon missiles, and improved the accuracy of their nuclear warheads. During the past 10 years, negotiations on strategic arms limitations agreements (SALT 1 and SALT 2) have accompanied and dissembled Soviet progress.

The SALT agreements are based on the so-called arms control doctrine. The crux of this doctrine may be described as follows: establish an arms ratio such that neither of the duelists will be tempted to use them. Arms control does not involve disarmament or the reduction of arms to a minimum: if each of the superpowers had only some 100 missiles, each would run the risk of being disarmed by a first strike, and this risk would increase instability.

The Americans focused their attention on the so-called strategic arms, in other words, on those weapons that could reach Soviet territory when launched from American territory or submarines (or vice versa). The SALT agreements are aimed at creating "stability" not between all the military resources of the two superpowers but between one category of nuclear weapons, namely intercontinental launchers. Insofar as these agreements achieve their goal, they "neutralize," as it were, these weapons. Stabilization entails nonutilization of these weapons, unless there is a direct attack against them or against national territory. What is left of their deterrent function? The very principle of SALT cannot help but revive, with greater urgency, the issue Europeans have been raising for the past 20 years: Is European security assured by NATO's conventional forces or by the thermo-nuclear capability of the United States?

In the early days of NATO, the presence of American troops symbolically obliterated the distance between the Old World and the New World: "Ich bin ein Berliner." An agreement limited to strategic arms widens the gulf between Western Europe and the United States. The lengthy Russian-American controversy over the Backfire bomber highlights the logic and the paradox of these negotiations at once and the same time: if the goal of these negotiations is equality or equivalence in one isolated field--long-range launchers--the Americans are logical in prohibiting giving the Backfire an intercontinental function or capability. But when this bomber is employed in the theater of operations, it contributes substantially to the strength

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of the Soviet bloc even though it would not add much to the arsenal of intercontinental launchers. Logical in an agreement limited to one type of weapon, illogical in an agreement encompassing all weapons.

Between the time the arms control doctrine was formulated and the SALT 2 negotiations were concluded, technical advances outstripped diplomacy.

A. Wohlstetter's famous article, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," has assumed a new current relevance. The number of nuclear warheads, augmented by the insertion of several warheads in each missile, and their accuracy, now make it possible for one of the two superpowers to destroy almost all of the other's land-based missiles in a first strike. In such a case, the only recourse left to the attacked party would be to retaliate with its SLBM's by striking at the aggressor's industrial and urban installations, but with the certainty of suffering a similar fate. After the first strike on the other's land-based missiles, the attacker still has thousands of nuclear warheads available for a third strike.

If the two superpowers have an equal (or equivalent) destruction capability, solely a counterforce operation remains plausible. One of the two (or both) superpowers may well have a first-strike capability against land-based missiles. In that case, one superpower would give the other no alternative but to negotiate after having lost most of its land-based missiles, or else counter by hitting cities at the risk of escalating into a suicidal orgy of violence. The increasing number of objections to SALT 2 reveals the impasse reached by negotiations restricted to intercontinental launchers. This agreement would not "stabilize" the ratio of intercontinental weapons, and at the same time it would separate the European theater from the nuclear capabilities of the two superpowers.

What is more, the Americans are now discovering that through their overconfidence in the resources of their technology, they have let themselves be equalled or surpassed in certain respects. Masters of miniaturization, they armed their Minuteman missiles with three (170-kiloton) nuclear warheads. The less skillful Soviets relied on heavy missiles whose throw weight exceeds by far the throw weight of all American missiles. The Soviets mount eight nuclear warheads of 2 megatons each in their SS-18 missiles. Between now and 1985, the 303 MIRVed SS-18's would present a destructive threat to the silos of U.S. land-based missiles.

In a few years time, with or without the ratification of SALT 2, specialists will perhaps deem that the Soviet Union has attained a certain superiority at the highest-level of intercontinental missiles: superiority is attributed to the country that has a better chance than its rival of destroying all of the other's land-based missiles in one fell swoop. All polemics aside, we do note that the implementation of arms control has furthered neither disarmament, nor the stability of the level of intercontinental weapons, nor Europe's security. This failure is due in part to the doctrine itself (restricted to one type of weapon), and in part to technical innovations

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(MIRV, firing accuracy). Technicians were making stability impossible at the same time that diplomats were doggedly seeking such stability. Soviet inferiority in miniaturization turned itself into superiority in the throw weight of heavy launchers. Optimists were rejoicing at "mutual assured destruction," unaware that, at the same time, the deterrent threat of nuclear weapons was becoming less and less plausible.

A number of Europeans will interpret the American doctrine as one prompted by the desire to spare U.S. territory the ravages of war, whatever the circumstances. Neutralization of the strategic forces does, in a way, exclude Soviet and American territories from the possible theater of operations. I am not convinced by this interpretation. By maintaining 200,000 to 300,000 of its soldiers in central Europe, the United States dooms itself to unprecedented disaster if it does not succeed in preventing, by every possible means, the invasion of Western Europe by Soviet troops. Two ideas guide the thinking and action of American officials and their advisers. The first is that Russian-American rivalry is inscribed in the "big book of history" but can assume more or less violent forms and attain a more or less high level of intensity. The second is that it is in the common interest of the two superpowers and of all mankind not to wage the "unthinkable" war.

These are reasonable ideas that can be endorsed but they do allow one element of doubt to linger. The course of diplomacy, crises and their outcome, are affected by the arms available to one side or the other. What influence will the results of SALT exercise on possible confrontations between the two superpowers? Considering the future status of nuclear forces in 1982 or 1985, would a confrontation of the same type as the 1962 Cuban crisis or the 1973 Yom Kippur War end in the same way?

China's Entry

Does the diplomatic activism of Mao Tse-tung's successors alter the structure of the system of relations between states? Even before the Great Helmsman's death, tension between Moscow and Peking had compelled the men in the Kremlin to mass 44 divisions and a fourth of their tactical air forces along the Chinese border. The resources required to maintain a large army in the Far East, with its bases and supplies, proportionately reduce the resources available in the West. Regardless of the state of relations between the Peoples Republic of China and the United States or European countries, the PRC, by its hostility toward the Soviet Union, is of service to the West. In the language of Marxist-Leninists, we can refer to it as an objective alliance. Objectively, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

What did change in 1978, however, was China's opening to the outside world and the policy of four modernizations: agriculture, industry, armed forces and technology. Deng Xiaoping has replaced the supremacy of ideology with the supremacy of efficiency (not without quoting, now and then, one of Mao's sayings when it agrees with current policy). At the same time, he is not

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reluctant to borrow machines from Westerners and also the dollars with which to buy them. The objective alliance assumes a new aspect the moment Westerners begin helping, with their money and know-how, the PRC's modernization effort, and consequently its economic and military reinforcement.

How far do Western interests in the strengthening of China extend? There are many Europeans and Westerners who wonder about a possible conflict between Western short-term and long term interests. What will Marxist China's policy line be tomorrow? The leader of the modernization-at-all-costs faction, Deng Xiaoping, is over 70 years old. Would a modernized and powerful China pursue a policy consistent with the material or moral interests of the United States or all Westerners?

Many more objections and misgivings can be expressed. They automatically come to mind. But what is at issue today is the response to be given to the PRC's advances. We lend money to the Soviet Union. We sell it complete factories. Why not do the same for China? The Soviet Union buys neither weapons nor nuclear power plants from us, whereas the PRC would like to buy some of these from us. The United States has decided not to sell arms to Peking but has already let it be known that it would not oppose any contrary decision by Europeans.

The Soviets definitely look with disfavor on this rapprochement between Westerners and Chinese. For our part, we must not delude ourselves about the military scope of this "objective alliance." If the Soviet Union were to launch an offensive limited to one or another of the hot spots on the Sino-Soviet border, the United States would have neither the intention nor the means of intervening. Likewise, assuming the Soviet Union launched its armed forces toward the Atlantic, China would not come to our rescue. China is not for Western Europe the ally at the enemy's back that Russia was for France at the beginning of the century.

The men in the Kremlin probably see a mortal danger in China's alliance with Japan and China's modernization with the help of the West. But this is only a medium-term or long-term matter. The Chinese armed forces are 20 years behind the Soviet armed forces from an equipment standpoint. Japan allocates about only 1 percent of its gross national product to its self-defense forces. I doubt that by playing the Chinese card, the United States will bring Moscow to display more flexibility or make more concessions. The opposite result seems more probable to me. The Vietnamese wanted, at all costs, to liquidate the Pol Pot regime. The Soviets, to say the least, were not annoyed when this liquidation occurred shortly after Washington's recognition of the People's Republic of China.

The Chinese rightly denounce Soviet hegemonism as the number-one enemy. From their viewpoint, quite obviously, because they have no common border with the United States, but do have a 2,000-kilometer border with the Soviet imperium in Asia. This formula is also true for a large part of the world. In Europe, the Soviet Union maintains a superiority in troops

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and equipment, not to mention its nuclear superiority (the mobile and MIRVed SS-20). More than the United States, the USSR is now determined to project its forces wherever the opportunity presents itself, and for such military expeditions it has more of its own forces (some 10 airborne divisions) and more furnished by its allies (Cuba) and the German Democratic Republic).

The leaders of the Soviet Union certainly do not agree with American professors who hold that military strength is playing a waning role in international relations. In the system of relations between states, divisions or missiles do count, as does also the will to use them. Soviet hegemonism replaces American imperialism in this respect.

World Market

In the early post-World War II period, the United States dominated the world market even more than the system of relations between states. The North Korean Army, augmented later by Chinese volunteers, held out against an American expeditionary force and highlighted the limits of the military power of the United States on the ground. The period of European colonization had passed. Countries other than Japan had acquired the resources and organization needed to practice the modern art of warfare. As for nuclear weapons, then a U.S. monopoly, they terrified neither Moscow nor Peking. Both moral and political reasons deterred the Washington leadership from employing them, even against communist "aggressors."

The United States alone ruled the world market, so to speak. It was the financial, commercial and industrial center of the so-called free world. It allocated available surplus capital to foreign investments. It held first place in most of the advanced technologies. Some 6 percent of the world's total population consumed 50 percent of the raw materials used by all mankind. It was an abnormal situation that could not last and it prompted the establishment of such international organizations as the International Monetary Fund, GATT, and the United Nations.

The Marshall Plan, and the recovery of Western Europe and Japan were consistent with the logic of the system of relations between states as well as the logic of the world market, such as these were viewed by leaders in Washington. What now remains of the United States' supremacy, some 30 years after the Marshall Plan?

Per capita production in Europe's most advanced countries now seems to be higher than that in the United States when we use the official rates of exchange. Even though the undervaluation of the dollar distorts these figures, the fact remains that per capita production in Switzerland, Sweden, and the Federal Republic of Germany, has come close to or equalled that in the United States. The United States still retains its superiority in an area that is the deciding factor in the system of relations between states, namely that only the United States combines high productivity with immense

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space and a large population. The Japanese population, half that of the United States, is concentrated within a narrow space. Western Europe is divided into countries, the most populated of which have no more than one-fourth the population of the United States. Japan and Western Europe lack raw materials and energy. They depend on foreign trade to a much greater degree than the American republic. Although Japan and Western Europe compete with the United States within the world market, they are not its rivals within the system of relations between states. They remain protected states, even when the American republic denounces the invasion of goods in Japan.

The Bretton Woods monetary system was maintained until 1971, for better or for worse. The overevaluation of the dollar favored, at one and the same time, expansion of international trade, growth of European exports, and increased foreign investments by large American companies. Since 1971, and especially since 1973, the United States has imposed a system of floating exchange rates. The world's monetary system continues to be determined in Washington, regardless of the negotiations that precede or disguise the American decisions. Lastly, in certain fields, such as civil aviation, petroleum technology, electronic data processing, and the conquest of space, American technology continues to pave the way.

Does Washington's monetary rule result from the role played by the United States in the system of relations between states? In the absence of gold, only the U.S. dollar can serve as an international currency. Neither the Tokyo government nor the Bonn government would like to have the mark or yen become a reserve currency (even though these two currencies are being used as such to some extent). The dollar is being used less and less as an accounting currency. The basket of currencies, a substitute for a monetary unit, attenuates fluctuations in the American currency. Central banks, towards which excess dollars flow, have to choose between two evils: either let the dollar's rate of exchange drop (something they fear for economic and business reasons) or else support the dollar's rate, action that frequently obliges them to buy billions of dollars, the inflationary effect of which is difficult to fully control. Up until 1971, Europeans endeavored to maintain a fixed rate between gold and the dollar, between the dollar and the principal currencies (not without a few revaluations of the mark and yen). Since then, the Japanese and Germans have wavered between two possible approaches: support the dollar or let it slide. At the present time, monetary officials in Bonn and Washington seem to be in agreement on a flexible defense of the dollar's rate of exchange.

If the GI's were no longer in Berlin would Europeans have the resources and will to oppose Washington's economic and monetary policy? The dollar quite naturally became the pound sterling of the 20th century. The gold standard probably demanded a dominant currency. Only the American currency could fill that position, but it now fills it quite poorly. Solely a European currency, in the full sense of the term, could deprive the American currency of its supremacy. This supremacy is disputed to the extent that distinct monetary areas are taking shape: an Asiatic area linked to the yen and a European area linked to the mark.

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The dollar's decline has, moreover, definitely hurt the prestige of the United States, just as OPEC's victorious revolt exposed the myth of the omnipotence of the United States. The military strength of the United States created the equivalent of the political framework in which world markets expanded in the past. The United States encouraged decolonization which reduced its European allies to a regional status. The abandonment of Vietnam and the quadrupling of the price of oil destroyed the illusions of a number of Americans and caused members of the world market to cease their superstitious deference to Washington's will. "The United States won't stand for it" is a formula that is going out of style. The United States will stand for it because economic or military reprisals are both proving to be equally ineffective. If Europeans and Japanese do not engage in negotiations on an equal footing with the United States, they have only themselves to blame and are victims of their own weakness or feeling of inferiority.

Two World Markets

Marxist-Leninists speak of two world markets, one capitalist, the other socialist. Actually, these two markets are not comparable. The second encompasses solely the East European countries and Cuba, joined recently by Vietnam upon the insistence of the Soviet Union so as strengthen the ties between Moscow and Hanoi and perpetuate the opposition between Hanoi and Peking. The countries of Eastern Europe have increased their trade with Western economies. Restricted to the Soviet zone of Europe and without convertible currencies, the so-called socialist world market is no substitute for or rival to the world market centered on the United States. It is marginal in relation to the international economy as a whole.

The Soviet Union contributes relatively little to aid for developing countries, and those very countries whose governments support progressivism or Marxism are not outside the capitalist world market. Oil producing countries sell their black gold to the advanced capitalist countries. The dollars they cannot spend immediately are deposited in the American banking system. Even when they assume power with Soviet assistance, the governments of Black Africa resume diplomatic relations with Western nations and do not leave the capitalist market.

Wherever government leaders uphold socialism or Sovietism, Moscow makes every effort to obtain naval and air bases, as is the case in Guinea, South Yemen and Mozambique. They strive to consolidate their position through the influence they have obtained with the country's armed forces. In Ethiopia, Soviet officers directed the offensive against the Somali in the Ogaden, and against the Eritrean "rebels" (rebels previously called a liberation movement that was supported by all Arab countries, by the progressive Arab countries first and foremost).

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In Africa, the intervention of Cuban troops transported by Soviet aircraft opened a new phase marked by the use of military forces far from the Soviet Union, resupplied and maintained by an airlift employing bases granted by friendly countries. The Soviet technique of expansion is based entirely on military force and infiltration or on political propaganda and has almost nothing to do with economic relations. In Africa, the United States is viewed as the center of the world market and the Soviet Union as one of the world's two great military powers.

Does Soviet expansion in Africa or the Middle East jeopardize the balance of forces or the world market? Everything depends on the geopolitical locality and the resources of the country that shifts from one allegiance to another.

An anti-Western regime in Iran, or a revolution in Saudi Arabia would simultaneously upset the economic order and the politico-military balance. Does the United States still have the means and the will to oppose such occurrences that belong under the internal affairs of sovereign states? Even in a nationalist regime ruled by the Shiite church, the leaders would probably not give up the wealth obtainable from black gold. Consequently they would sell their oil but would be less concerned about the world market or the interests of consuming countries. They would not maintain the security of the Persian Gulf on behalf of Westerners. A change of regime in Saudi Arabia would have even more serious consequences. Would the new masters follow the same policy on prices, on the amount of oil produced. The cement of the de facto alliance between Saudi Arabia and the United States is the fear of revolution that grips the royal family in Riyadh. The traditionalist and religious ruling family whose ancestor unified the tribes of Arabia, uses its oil money to support moderate, anti-Soviet, and antiprogressive regimes. The United States would no longer have any means of exerting much pressure on an Islamic progressive regime.

The orderly operation of the world market would be at the mercy of leaders hostile to modern civilization, hostile to capitalism above all. In both cases, the operation of the world economy would depend on men ignorant of that economy's methods. It is quite conceivable that after the period of turmoil, the revolutionaries in Tehran and Riyadh, more nationalist than progressive and anti-Soviet by religion, would come back, little by little, into the world economy and accept its restraints. But should this happen, the shock suffered by the United States, much more serious than the Vietnam defeat, would spread throughout the five continents and would force the leadership in Washington into an agonizing reappraisal.

The American military presence in Turkey or in Saudi Arabia hangs on the will of the governments in Riyadh and Ankara. Of course, this is no different than the military facilities granted the Soviet Union by Egypt and Somalia, and subsequently withdrawn. But the Soviet failure in Egypt--in Somalia, the failure was the price paid for success in Ethiopia--involved solely the system of relations between states. It did not affect the socialist world market. On the other hand, a break between Iran or Saudi Arabia and the United States would shake the world economy essential to American prosperity and, even more so, to the prosperity of its European allies.

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This break would symbolize the inability of the United States to preserve the allegiance of countries that are most essential to the safeguarding of its interests. American power in diplomatic activity stemmed in large part to America's prestige. Washington was credited with having the capability of ruling without resorting to gunboat diplomacy. In the final analysis, such confidence was ill-founded: modernization, per se, erodes traditional authority, uproots the masses, and multiplies grievances against the men in power and their American protectors. The Shah, a modernizing despot, became the focus of all the resentment of both students and the Moslem faithful. The Americans helped their friends to take precautions against a military coup. But neither the religious leaders, nor the Iranian armed forces, nor the American advisors knew of any effective strategy against a popular uprising.

The weakening position of the United States in the international economy heightens the original contradiction of the present-day world: a world market without a world empire. American supremacy created the appearance of an empire. Propaganda denounced the American empire, thereby confusing two quite different phenomena: the influence exercised by the United States in Latin America, Europe, and Asia; the economic order which, considered as an order, was called imperialistic. Lenin had attributed World War I to the partitioning of other continents. Once the colonial empires of the European countries had disappeared, the organization itself of intercontinental trade was, as such, called imperialism (multinational companies, exploitation of mineral resources by foreign capital).

Faced with the agitation that began in Afghanistan and Iran and then spread throughout the region, Peking did not hesitate. It sided with the Shah against the religious and secular rebels. When Deng Xiaoping adopted the policy of the four modernizations, Peking thereby took a stand against everything that could hinder or disorganize international trade. Moreover, these threats to the world market also strengthened Soviet hegemonism. If, through progressive governments, the Soviet Union were to control Middle East oil, it would enlarge its military empire and hold the European economy at its mercy.

Viewed from the outside, the Soviet attitude does appear ambiguous. Even though it does not belong to the world market, the Soviet Union does, nevertheless, feel the effects of crises that shake that market. It does not want to see chaos in a bordering country, but neither does it want to overlook the opportunity given it by the revolution led by religious leaders. In Iran, the West relied on a modernizing but despotic regime. The succeeding regime, apart from its religious reaction, will remain aloof from Washington, assuming that it does not take the road that leads to Moscow.

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American Decline, Soviet Power

The distinction between the international system and the world economy does not adequately suggest a clear and simple picture of international relations at the end of the 1970's. It does shed light, however, on the passage from American imperialism to Soviet hegemonism.

In the eyes of observers, the American republic appears to be declining. For three major reasons: the SALT agreements, of American inspiration, are leading to equality or equivalence in intercontinental nuclear forces, and perhaps soon to Soviet superiority, thereby giving the Soviet Union, on paper, overall superiority since it already has more divisions and tanks than the American republic; the inability of the United States to prevent social and political upheavals that produce a shift of allegiance by certain countries of vital importance in the world market; the reduction in the American economy's margin of superiority over its commercial competitors and the dollar's permanent slump.

In drawing closer to the United States, China is acting in conformity with the inevitable logic of power politics. The Soviet Union is nearer to vital centers of Chinese territory than is the United States. What is more, when and if American military power is employed, it tends not to expand itself but to reinforce the threatened countries. Apart from the conquest of the American continent, completed at the close of the last century, there is no American imperialism of czarist Russia or the Soviet Union. American strategy in Vietnam remained defensive. Its purpose was to prevent Hanoi's communism from swallowing up South Vietnam. The intervention in Vietnam did not resemble imperialism in the ordinary meaning of that word, namely the conquest of lands and peoples. China does not fear the imperialism constituted by multinational corporations and foreign investments. In fact, it urgently wants the help of such imperialism. China is counting on capitalism's characteristic blind passion for profit to obtain loans and the scientific and technological know-how necessary to its modernization.

If the Chinese use another word to designate and denounce Soviet action--a word Westerners translate as "hegemonism"--they are right, even though the word chosen does not correspond exactly to the real situation. The Soviet Union exercises its dominion over Eastern Europe by military force and sets limits on the tolerable diversity between regimes within the socialist community. The People's Republic of China is in fear of being encircled by the coalition of the Soviet Union and its allies. Japan and the United States deem that strengthening China militarily will contribute to Asiatic stability within the system of relations between states. The opening of the PRC to trade with the West expands the world market.

Could China's opting against Soviet hegemonism and for American imperialism be repeated tomorrow in other continents? In Latin America, the Soviet Union is far away and the United States is nearby. Leaving Cuba aside, one meets very few Soviets and a great many Americans in Latin America. Likewise,

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in Iran there were, and in Saudi Arabia there are many Americans and few Soviets. The Egyptians had thousands of Soviet military and technical advisers, and subsequently sent them away. In other countries, in Africa, the Soviets are no longer liked by the people whose leaders had opted for socialism (Mali, Guinea). Black students returning from the East denounce the racism to which they were subjected. It is said that Cubans are more successful in Africa than the Soviets.

There are still three theaters of operation in which the East-West conflict continues directly or indirectly: Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. In Africa, the Soviets have changed the rules of the game by committing Cuban troops and their military advisers. The ultimate fate of countries governed by liberation movements or parties upholding socialism is not yet determined. They may well turn back toward the West for economic reasons. But the Soviets are doing their utmost to ensure continuation of their success by military presence. The Chinese would describe this conflict as hegemonism versus imperialism, arms versus goods. At the present time, imperialism is defined as the indispensable assistance of Western capital and technology.

In the Middle East, Moscow is not pitted directly against Washington. It is the revolt of the masses or progressive minorities against despots--whether they be modernizers or not--linked to the United States, a country that symbolizes either the death of tradition, or the suppression of liberties, or support of a discredited throne. In that region, it is the world market that is being challenged, not by Moscow but by the people, possibly for the greater glory of Moscow.

In Europe, the 1945 borders gradually became stabilized, crystallized. The FRG and GDR now accept each other. The two coalitions continue their peaceful confrontation, not without preparing for a test of strength in which Westerners no longer believe. Not so much because Europeans have faith in NATO, in conventional forces, or in the American nuclear umbrella. They trust in the prudence of the Bolsheviks who are awake to the incalculable dangers of a massive attack against Western Europe and fully conscious of the economic aid they receive from the latter.

In view of what I have said, the period we are now entering, in 1979, promises to be anything but calm and quiet. The American republic has not found a bipartisan policy, a view of the conjuncture, a clearly defined will. The Iranian revolution illustrates the precariousness of the regimes on which, for lack of something better, American diplomacy is based. In Europe, the Soviet Union, lacking the prestige of a liberating power, retains its reputation as the world's largest army.

With such an accumulation of weapons, such a failure to recognize the perils, we are laboring under our own delusions or are we as sure as all that of the prudence of the Soviets?

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY FATAc DESCRIBED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Sep 79 pp 38-39

[Article by Maj Christian Auzepy: "The Nuclear Factor in the Tactical Air Force"]

[Text] It is in 1972 that FATAc [Tactical Air Force] was entrusted with the responsibility for putting the tactical nuclear weapon into service. This new assignment has considerably increased the importance of this high command which now has a determinant role in our defense system. Indeed, the use of the tactical nuclear weapon must be considered as the final military warning to an aggressor before committing the strategic air force.

Two squadrons with nuclear capability and equipped with all-weather penetration missiles were thus established at Luxeuil and Saint Dizier. Their assembly at these bases necessitated the realization of special infra-structural facilities and the beefing up of security and defense capabilities. The 4th and 7th Fighter Squadrons constitute the tactical nuclear air component. They have thus reactivated within a national framework the nuclear mission that had devolved on the air force in the Atlantic Alliance until 1965.

Integral Part of Deterrence

The nuclear weapon entrusted to FATAc is called "tactical" because its use is planned against military targets involving the forces of a potential aggressor. In addition, its deliberately limited power makes it possible to hit specific targets without important collateral damage.

Of the same nature as strategic nuclear weapons, the ANT [Tactical Nuclear Weapon] is an integral part of the deterrent panoply. Indeed, its use would constitute the ultimate means of demonstrating to an adversary our determination and resolve of defense and would especially signal a radical change in the nature of the conflict. In other words, it would indicate our firm resolve to resort to massive strategic nuclear reprisals if the adversary pursued his action.

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The role of the ANT is thus of primary importance. By virtue of its very existence it makes it possible to avoid the "all-or-nothing" alternative and thus reinforces the deterrent by increasing its credibility and flexibility.

Highly Qualified Personnel and Completely Adapted Capabilities

Tactical nuclear capabilities are made up of nuclear weapons, called AN 52, onboard Mirage III E and Jaguar aircraft. The weapons system is composed of a nuclear warhead, a missile, and a pilot.

The AN 52 assumes the form of a streamlined projectile equipped with fixed stabilizers. Its design is entirely French and its military payload was perfected by the [French] Atomic Energy Commission. Its explosive power is in the order of 25 kilotons of TNT (trinitrotoluene), which corresponds to the power of the bomb dropped at Hiroshima, Japan.

The aircraft entrusted with delivering this weapon are of two types:

1. The Mirage III E is used by two wings of the 4th Fighter Squadron. This is a single-seat aircraft propelled by one Atar jet engine insuring it high speed at both high and low altitudes. In its penetration mission its operational radius is 600 km thanks to additional fuel tanks.

This craft is equipped with frontal radar for navigation and for following terrain contour, an autonomous navigation system made up of a computer hooked up to a Doppler system, and navigational aid equipment. Such navigation and control equipment has an accuracy compatible with the weapon's power and the targets assigned to its regardless of weather conditions.

2. The Jaguar A is used by two wings of the 7th Fighter Squadron. Of French-British design, it is also a single-seat fighter. It is equipped with two Adour jet engines with low fuel consumption giving it a radius of 750 km at very low altitudes. The Jaguar A aircraft is particularly well suited for long missions and it can cover 7,000 km thanks to in-flight refueling. The lack of on-board radar is offset by a very accurate navigational system which makes the use of the Jaguar possible under all weather conditions.

A nuclear weapons system is a package to which the base support and air units are closely linked. The environment of a nuclear squadron indeed entails particular constraints in the area of defense and security. Thus, at each base able to accommodate a nuclear squadron strictly controlled access zones have been established, namely,

- a. The technical and operational zone is the squadron base in peacetime. It is used for daily training and maintenance operations.

- b. The tactical alert zone covers a dispersion area. It includes honeycombs equipped with antiaircraft shelters slated to house aircraft. This zone is

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used for the placing on alert of aircraft armed with the AN 52 weapon. It is entirely autonomous: Buildings necessary for the housing of personnel, pilots, and technicians are available there. Specific and back-up means of communication link it to the command posts of the nuclear forces charged with transmitting the orders and directives of the political authority.

3. The special ammunition store and workshop is particularly well guarded and protected with special merlons as are the buildings used for the storage of the core and warheads as well as for their assembly.

In addition, a PCSN [Nuclear Security Command Post] is linked by a detection and alarm network to the various nerve centers of the base. It centralizes information and coordinates all operations, especially those of the unit charged with fire-prevention which has important and effective means.

Operational personnel, whether pilot or technician, are the subject of strict selection. Their qualification and professional conscience are essential elements of the system's value.

Their efficiency is continually tested and improved by intensive training and the performance of specific exercises. The latter, executed on training equipment which is similar to real weapons in all respects, have as their essential purpose to instill automatic reflexes for very strict procedures in all personnel.

In particular, the "Centaur" bombing section arranges each year a context among squadrons with a nuclear mission. Besides the desirable emulation that it generates, the contest enables the command to gauge the over-all effectiveness of the weapons system. Indeed, the exercise involved is executed in a manner as close as possible to real conditions.

Secure Weapons System

Safety in the use of the tactical nuclear weapon is guaranteed by the existence of strict government control and by appropriate safety procedures.

Government control has as its goal to enable the head of state to use nuclear power at all times under those conditions that he will have set and to bar any use of these weapons without his order.

For that purpose there is a national gendarmerie unit specially charged with guarding these weapons.

Specialized and back-up means make it possible to transmit an operations order under all circumstances.

Furthermore, the protection of the missiles is of primary importance. Too, their placement in antiaircraft shelters is systematic. Antiaircraft and other facilities at the air bases have been reinforced and modernized by the use of antiaircraft defenses characterized by very good performance at

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altitude. In addition, various safety measures are planned to remove the over-all force from the direct action of the adversary. An initial deployment plan obviates the concentration of nuclear capabilities at a small number of bases and defense plans are applied to each squadron as a function of immediate or potential threat.

Nuclear Security: An Indispensable Need at All Times

The principal responsibility of the command is that of nuclear security.

In this field strictness is an absolute rule. Nuclear security is based on a package of technical measures and operational orders which make it possible to prevent and eliminate any risk of accident and in the very improbable case where it should occur to limit its consequences. The package of nuclear security measures guarantees a complete absence of risk for the environment.

Thus, nuclear security has been studied at the technical level since the planning of the tactical weapon. The risk of nuclear explosion is absolutely nil. Indeed, while at power stations controlled nuclear reaction occurs on a permanent basis, nuclear weapons are normally deactivated and can only be activated following their release. In order to reinforce their security still further, flights with live weapons are strictly forbidden in peacetime and can be authorized in times of crises only by the political authority.

The manipulation and control of nuclear matter are the subject of very special attention. Directives and very strict procedures codify all nuclear operations and leave no room for improvisation or even initiative. They are applied on a permanent basis by specialized, highly qualified, and rigorously trained personnel. In addition, detection and alert equipment systematically controls the environment of arms stores and is connected with the nuclear security command post.

In addition, the bases are equipped with immediate attack potentials whose operations are coordinated by the PCSN. In particular, important firefighting equipment is systematically on the alert. Indeed, the most important risk continues to be fire on board of an armed aircraft. That is why it is the subject of constant watch.

Finally, the beefed-up protection of arms stores and their constant watch prohibit any diversion of fissionable matter. Each base at which a nuclear unit is stationed has a section of specially trained commandos for immediate action in case of threat against any of its nerve centers.

Twenty years ago the French air force acquired some experience in the use of nuclear weapons. To date the lack of incidents proves that the techniques and orders in effect are completely suitable and obviate all risk. These security measures however encumber neither safety in the use of the arms system nor its operational availability.

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The nuclear weapon demands a particular state of mind and strictness at all times and in all fields. Served by highly qualified personnel and activated by great professional consciousness, the pilots in our tactical nuclear force are particularly well trained in FATAC to accomplish the mission which the government assigns to them in our defense strategy.

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Maj Christian Auzepy graduated from the Air Academy, class of 1963. A navigator and radar bombardier assigned to the strategic air force, he was an operations officer in bomber squadron 1192--the "Bourgogne"--and squadron 2193--the "Cevennes"--and commanded the operations of bomber squadron 1194--the "Guyenne." He is now responsible for nuclear planning at the headquarters of the tactical air force.

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

SOVIET NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY, WEST EUROPEAN VULNERABILITY

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 8-14 Sep 79 pp 86-87

[Article by Jean-Francois Revel: "Kissinger's Warning"]

[Text] Some 100 military experts, strategic and political analysts, economists and historians, generals, admirals, members of parliaments, statesmen and businessmen, diplomats and ministers, active and retired, nay, like General Haig, candidates to the presidency of the United States, met behind closed doors on 1-3 September at the Palais d'Egmont in Brussels under the chairmanships of Henry Kissinger and of Belgian Foreign Minister Henri Simonet to discuss the future of Western security.

Their principal conclusion or, to better put it, the basic, undisputed consensus was that the Soviet Union has now attained military superiority or at the very least military equality with the West. It is interesting to note that to open one's eyes to this fact is no longer automatically considered a symptom of pathological warmongering. Recognition of the danger is now authorized; however, its enunciation remains timid. To use Henry Kissinger's phrasing, the member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] "have fallen behind in all the significant military domains except naval forces, where, however, our lead is rapidly diminishing" (see Christian d'Epenoux's article in LIVRES).

Militarily, the Soviets now hold a twofold superiority, particularly over Western Europe: the previously known superiority of their conventional forces, and the recently confirmed superiority of their continental, so-called "theater," nuclear armaments, that is, those deployed in the theater of operations. Specifically, the USSR has new medium-range missiles at its disposal--the SS 20--that are capable of striking Western Europe but not the United States, and whose fabrication is, because of this, not limited by the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement [SALT II].

These very precise missiles can destroy, in their emplacements, the missiles deployed in Western Europe. We could not respond to such an attack, because NATO has no equivalent weapon whatever at its disposal and because NATO's nuclear weapons are designed to strike cities and populations, and not

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military objectives. The nuclear arsenal deployed in Europe could, in case of conflict, be destroyed on the ground before it even went into action, which nullifies its deterrent power. This holds equally true for the French nuclear strike force, whose deterrent value is thus reduced or annulled, except as regards submarine-launched missiles (see Jerome Dumoulin's article). Recently sent up trial balloons on the subject of a Franco-German atomic force have in fact not been taken seriously in Brussels. "In sum," I was told smilingly by a German expert, "the intent is that Germany should withdraw from NATO to pay for nuclear armament to be ordered from the French."

The European members of NATO, and France, thus find themselves lacking the nuclear weapons for a suitable response to the latest generation of Soviet weapons. What then is there to defend Europe in case of aggression? More than ever, it must be the American strategic force, that is, missiles launched from the United States. It is precisely on this point that Henry Kissinger deliberately sought to foment doubt, and even sow panic in the minds of his European listeners.

Kissinger today can most adequately be defined as a retiree who has more influence on world politics than any statesman in office. It was sufficient for the former American security head to characterize as doubtful an eventual American nuclear response in case of a Soviet attack on Europe for the entire conference to go into gyration around his few words. And well they might: "I will say it here, and I would not have said it when I was in the government: Our European allies should not continue asking us for increased strategic commitments that we cannot sincerely give them, and that even if sincerely given we would not implement, because if we implemented them we would risk the destruction of civilization."

Having said, Henry Kissinger disappeared for 24 hours, to attend to some personal matters in Paris. When he reappeared at the meeting on Sunday night and took stock of the havoc his statement had worked he tried to rectify and even to retract his statement, saying that he had never intended to say that American deterrence had ceased to be credible. "The abandonment of American nuclear guarantees to Europe is unthinkable," commented General Haig, former NATO commander in chief. "No American president could survive it."

The fact is that Kissinger very loudly and clearly intended to say and did say that to the two Western inferiorities mentioned above--in conventional and "theater" armaments--an American "strategic" inferiority would be added during the 1980's, that is, in the domain of long-range intercontinental nuclear armament. In stating that no president of the United States, faced with the eventuality of a Soviet aggression in Europe--a necessarily partial, limited and measured attack--would dare order a global strategic response, consisting of the massive destruction of civilian populations, Kissinger was purposely stripping the horror of the situation down to its essentials. Militarily, it is not true that the United State's sole available response is the destruction of populations. It, too, has sufficiently precise missiles to destroy nuclear launching installations on the ground.

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Politically, however, Kissinger's statement was intended to awaken Americans and Europeans to the realities of the 4 or 5 years ahead--realities that have one name: vulnerability.

This vulnerability has in fact been sought by the Western nations themselves, as an instrument of detente. For the last 10 years or more, since the departure from France of the integrated NATO command in 1966, we have in effect been living in a system of unilateral concessions. In other words, we have been living in a construct wherein, to better negotiate with the Soviets, we start out by voluntarily weakening ourselves.

This aberrant conception of *detente*, to which Kissinger does not deny having made his own contribution, consists of renouncing in advance, (in order to induce [in italics]) a negotiation, that which is to be the stakes in the negotiation or one's strongest negotiating position.

When the Americans abandoned the B1 bomber project, they requested the Soviets to reciprocate with a counterpart action; the Americans are still waiting for that action. When it became a question of equipping the NATO forces with the neutron bomb, which was the last word in tactical weapons, Carter pulled back so as not to anger the Soviets. Equipping oneself for one's own defense is now a provocation! And, to borrow from Kissinger's phrasings, we have imbued ourselves with this narcotic theory that "by being vulnerable we contribute to peace, and by being invulnerable we increase the risk of war."

Now, can the USSR be expected not to turn its military superiority to political advantage? It is already doing so. In December 1978, Leonid Brezhnev wrote a coercive letter to all the Western European heads of state or prime ministers, threatening them with reprisals in the event they were to accept the deployment of neutron bombs on their national territories. A single Western power protested against that unacceptable letter (which was never made public): Italy. On 9 August 1979, SOVIETSKAYA ROSSIA, the organ of the Soviet Union's Communist Party Central Committee, published that Western Europe "would play the role of target" for Soviet missiles in the event of a global conflict.

A kindly warning, which in good Russian would be called blackmail: If you arm yourself we will destroy you; if you disarm yourself we will rule you. End of message. Please acknowledge.

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

FRANCO-BELGIAN MISUNDERSTANDING--It was because France refused to buy the Belgian Epervier aircraft for battlefield surveillance missions that Belgium decided to order American M-113 tracked vehicles instead of the VAB [advance armored vehicle] manufactured by Creusot-Loire. French refusal to buy the Epervier stemmed from its poor showing during tests and in spite of suggestions by both French and Belgian industry that they get together on the production of the aircraft's engine. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 29 Oct 79 p 29]

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

CIVIL AVIATION BUDGET FOR 1980 OUTLINED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 22 Sep 79 pp 10-11

[Text] As he had announced last year when he presented the civil aviation, land transportation and merchant marine budgets for 1979, Minister of Transport Joel Le Theule this year has presented a single overall budget in a new form, in keeping with the functions and organization of the ministry.

Thus, the budget document which consists of five subsections (one common section containing the credits assigned to the central administration as newly organized and the credits for research, plus four sections for the specific credits assigned to each general directorate and directorate) becomes a one and only packet; and the transport budget this year will require only one submittal to Parliament for a single vote on its Title III credits and one on its Title V credits.

By sections, the proposed budget breaks down as follows (DO & CP = operating expenses + disbursements for current programs; AP = new program authorizations):

	CO + CP (in millions of francs)	AP (in millions of francs)
Common section	906	191
Civil Aviation	3,037	1,514
Merchant marine and ports	4,271	2,403
Domestic transport (ground transportation, waterways, roads, traffic control)	26,604*	6,751*
Meteorology	<u>363</u>	<u>79</u>
Total	35,181	10,938

*including the special fund for national road network investments, to which the budget allocates 4,717 million francs for current programs and 5,304 million francs for new program authorized.

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During a press conference called last week by Mr Joel Le Theule, he discussed the principal activities covered by the budget, which he voluntarily limited to four: traffic safety and control; maintenance, construction and operation of the transport infrastructures; the economic domain within the province of the Ministry of Transport; general supervision of those public enterprises for which the ministry has oversight responsibility and of public enterprise agreements.

We shall discuss here only so much of these activities as pertains directly to civil aviation and air transport.

Air Traffic Control and Technical Inspection of Aircraft

These two headings provide for the creation of 90 new jobs and the procurement of 155 million francs of additional equipment, based on the following justifications:

Air traffic is growing steadily; the number of movements controlled by The French regional control centers has risen since 1974 at an annually compounded rate of between 2 and 5 percent. The actual number of aircraft movements controlled went from 1,017,000 in 1977 to 1,049,000 in 1978, and it is estimated at 1,090,000 for 1979.

Despite this growth in traffic, the level of safety--which can be measured by the ratio of control accidents ("airmisses") determined by inquiry to the volume of traffic controlled--has steadily risen. This ratio per 100,000 movements, controlled dropped from 6.3 in 1977 to 5.8 in 1978. This favorable downtrend continued during the first half of 1979.

The minister indicated that these satisfactory results have been obtained through a major effort that has been undertaken to adapt the equipment in use to the growth in traffic. This effort consists essentially of:

- renewal of equipment: a control assistance information system renewal program has been set up to replace the present centralized system with a system of doubly and even triply redundant minicomputers to increase the availability and reliability of information;
- improvement of control facilities: two improvements are notable in this regard: introduction of the "safety net" in the information processing (cf. AIR & COSMOS No 769) and renovation of the telecommunications facilities;
- augmentation of control system capacity: the new Reims Regional Control Center which will become operational in the beginning of 1983 will relieve the Paris Center and eliminate saturation conditions. The 1980 budget provides 38 million francs of new program authorizations for this purpose. The total cost of this project will be 199 million francs.

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The inspection of aircraft and, in a more general way, keeping track of their airworthiness is an essential function from the standpoint of ensuring the safety of the planes. For the technical operations involved, the Ministry of Transport is assisted by the services assigned to the Ministry of Defense and especially by the Flight Testing Center.

Paired with the development of our French-manufactured aircraft, the minister underlined, our services in this domain have gained a reputation that is no longer questioned internationally. This policy of navigability inspection will be continued, on the domestic as well as the international levels, because it is an indispensable component of our aircraft manufacturing policy.

Development of Infrastructures

For the major enterprises and especially the SNCF [French National Railroads], Air France, the RATP [Independent Parisian Transport System] and the Paris Airport, the budget provides an investment program totaling more than 11 billion francs, subject to authorization by the board of directors of the FDES [Economic and Social Development Fund].

In the airport sector, for which the proposed budget provides 116 million francs of new program authorizations, the principal project will be that of the southern extension to the Nice airport (52 million francs).

Oversight of Public Enterprises

The minister recalled in this regard that Air France in 1978, and the SNCF and CGM [General Maritime Company] in 1979, signed public enterprise agreements and that consequently the 1980 budgetary credits allotted to them are based on those agreements: the 1980 grant to Air France will be 335 million francs (395 million francs in 1979); and to the SNCF it will be 17.233 billion francs.

The public enterprise agreement signed with Air France on 26 January 1978 established as a primary objective the straightening out of the company's financial situation. This objective was achieved and the state is therefore limiting itself to compensation for certain specific obligations.

The state expects the company to maximize, within the limits of its current financial possibilities, the number of new transport facilities, with first priority to the consolidation and improvement of its public service facilities in the Overseas Departments and Territories. It would be inconceivable indeed that the state subsidy received by Air France not be used to the maximum benefit of the company's users.

The current contract expires at the end of 1980, and the post-contract period has been the object of an in-depth study by the company in the form of a public enterprise plan covering the period 1980-1983. The form of its contractual relations with the state will be the object of later studies.

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A major component of the financial relations between Air France and the state lies outside the Transport Ministry's budget, in fact, and in loans from the FDES for the modernization and expansion of its fleet. The company's investments in 1980 will be in the order of 2 billion francs of which more than 1.5 billion will be financed by loan. It is recalled that Air France is to increase its fleet, between 1980 and 1983, by 13 Boeing 747's, 9 A 300 Airbuses, 5 A 310 Airbuses, and 14 Boeing 727's. In 1980 alone, three Boeing 747's (one of which will be cargo), three A 300 Airbuses and five Boeing 727's will be ordered.

The state's relations with Air Inter are situated within a slightly different context--that of a special agreement. The current special agreement signed 8 May 1974 expires at the end of 1980. Prior to 30 June of this year, the state gave the required notice of termination so as to keep its future options open. Air Inter's activity, initially directed toward serving a small number of passengers, is now expanding rapidly into one of mass transportation. The state's sole financial contribution is related to the "Mercury protocol" (24 million francs in 1980).

Lastly, it might be noted that the air route from border to border with Corsica is to be served, beginning in 1981, by a newly created joint Air France-Air Inter subsidiary. This creation will, in any case, not affect the 1980 budget.

Air transport offers the most efficient means of ungirding Corsica: It offers fast connections on an adequate schedule between the island and the major French gateways on the Mediterranean coast: Marseilles and Nice. To fulfill this role, the president of the republic asked that rates be lowered this winter and that flight schedules border to border, that is, Marseille or Nice and Corsica, be increased.

To meet this requirement, the state has had to intervene financially and the Transport Ministry's 1980 budget will, for the first time, include a 12 million franc subsidy to the Air France and Air Inter companies serving this route.

Civil Aviation Programs

Transport Minister Joel Le Theule dedicated a major portion of his 13 September press conference--during which he discussed the general lines of his ministry's 1980 budget--to the civil aviation programs which have been funded by program authorizations totaling 1.223 billion francs, an increase of 13.5 percent over 1979.

384 Airbuses for 34 Airlines

A little more than half the new program authorizations, or 623 million francs, and almost half the current program outpayment credits (563 million out of 1.1986 billion francs) have been allocated to airbuses. Increases in production capacities must first be funded to meet the rapid increase in

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orders for airbuses. As of 1 September, Airbus Industrie had in hand firm orders for 227 planes and options from 28 airlines for 132 planes. But the minister revealed that to these must be added 24 planes for six airlines which had sent letters of intent accompanied by cash binders. The grand total is thus 384 airbuses sold to 34 airlines. The credits allotted for the 1980 budget must also provide for development of the A 310 version and for improvements to the B 2 and B 4 versions to enable these versions to meet competition.

450 CFM 56 Engines Ordered

The CFM 56 engine program has been allotted 318 million francs of new program authorizations, or about one-fourth the total, and 345 million francs, or about 30 percent of the total, for current program outlays. These allocations will cover, besides the forthcoming acceptance testing of the engine, its further development, improvements and adaptations, especially to the DC-8. The minister stated that as of 1 September, 57 firm orders for adaptation of the CFM 56 to DC-8 had been recorded as well as 33 options, representing a total of 450 engines (4 engines plus 1 spare per plane).

Remaining One-Fourth to Other Rubrics

About one-fourth of the total budget thus remains for allocations to the other rubrics. Of these, the largest allocation for new program authorizations is to the Concored (115 million francs, in addition to a like sum for current programs) to support the scheduled airline operation of this type of craft.

A substantial sum is also allocated for helicopters: 44.6 million francs in new program authorizations, plus an equal sum for procurement under existing programs as follows: 5 million francs for the two-engined Ecureuil; 15.6 million francs for the Super Puma; 14 million francs for the Makila; and 10 million francs for a new helicopter engine. The minister stressed the growing importance of civilian helicopter exports to total helicopter exports. During 1977-1979, 69 percent of the 814 helicopters sold went to civilian users. From a value standpoint, military helicopters are still dominant.

The third of these other rubrics, in order of budgetary size, is that of aircraft-installed equipment, with allocations of 36 million francs for new program authorizations and 20 million francs for current program expenditures. The minister observed that over the last 10 years this branch of the industry has gradually gained a foothold, and a solid one, in the highly competitive terrain of commercial aviation. This budgetary aid is intended to enable the future consolidation of acquired positions, by way of providing support for new equipment studies involving particularly fast-changing technologies.

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Still another rubric that merits attention is that of new aircraft studies (25 million francs in new program authorizations and an equal amount under current programs) on the three types being worked on by Airbus Industrie (B 9, B 11, and a 160-passenger, narrow-aisle, twin-jet plane), on basic studies of advanced types of aircraft (10 million in new programs and 6 million under current programs), and on exploratory development work (25 million in new programs and 20 million under current programs) in connection with specific programs; the object of this work is to increase our knowledge in respect to the long-range prospects in view, especially for new equipment and for the latest developments in the field of aerodynamics.

In the area of light aviation equipment, the budget provides for 6 million francs in new program authorizations and 5 million francs under current programs.

A subsidy to research and development of air navigational safety equipment was established in 1978 and is being maintained over a 4-year period at a level of 20 million francs a year. The minister pointed out that detection systems and air navigation equipment represent an export value of 4 billion francs out of a total export value of 8.9 billion francs for professional electronic equipment. Ground equipment involved in civil aviation flight safety is estimated to represent 300 million francs. These exports are characterized by a high value-added level (85 percent) and by their market in industrialized countries, planned-economy countries, and developing countries alike. The goal that has been set for these exports in the next few years is to occupy 25 percent of the market outside the United States.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

OBJECTIVES, TACTICS OF FATAc DELINEATED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Sep 79 pp 32-37

[Article by Air Force Lt Gen Michel Forget: "The Tactical Air Force: A Fighting Tool, a Deterrence Factor"--passages between slantlines published in italics]

[Text] Together with the strategic air forces, the air defense forces and the military air transport, the tactical air force [FATAc] constitutes one of the four great commands set up by the Air Force in the utilization of our forces.

The tactical air force consists of 315 modern fighter planes, or the totality of all the Jaguars and nearly all the Mirage III's of the Air Force, divided into 21 squadrons* of which four are equipped with nuclear tactical weaponry. FATAc has its own chain of command, signal means and control system.

The whole constitutes a /basically offensive/ fighting tool. This means that from the very moment when our forces are engaged against those of an aggressor, the main mission of the FATAc units is to search and destroy the enemy forces wherever they are. In more precise terms:

--It means first of all that from the very start of a crisis or of a conflict one must /"go to see what is happening,"/ participate in the search for enemy elements in order to locate them and to give details of their main axes of action or their intentions. This is the aim of the tactical reconnaissance missions.

--Then it means to attack the enemy forces on the ground, not only within the zone of the battlefield in direct or indirect support of our troops but also deep inside enemy territory where he has massed his reinforcements, where the sources of his logistics are and where--most often--it happens that his tactical air units are found also. This is the aim of the attack missions.

*In theory a fighting squadron has 15 planes, some 20 pilots, and a number of mechanics necessary for keeping it operational.

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--It means also to /oppose the enemy in the air/, in flight, to prevent the latter from going after our own units which must have their free movement unhampered. This is the aim of the so-called "cover" missions over the head of our troops, missions which are defensive in nature. As we see later, these missions constitute however only one of many procedures for responding to the attacks by the enemy air force.

In recalling these general missions, one sees at once two essential characteristics of FATAC emerge. On the one hand it becomes clear that the units of FATAC, although they are capable of independent action, are meant above all to operate in the framework of combined operations. They belong then to the realm of combat operations in /cooperation/ with other forces both on land and/or on the sea. On the other hand, the very frame of its actions imposes to FATAC the need to give maximum mobility not only to its air units but also to its command posts, its signal means, its control centers and its logistics. This need for mobility is all the more important because the FATAC units are called to operate on extremely diverse theaters of action.

The above considerations could apply--with minor modifications--to all tactical air force. The listing of the missions--reconnaissance, attack, cover--and the criteria of mobility and cooperative functioning can in fact be seen as the common denominator. Yet, leaving aside all questions of equipment and performance, there is hardly any similarity between the FATAC of today and the tactical air commands of the 1950's, between today's FATAC and the tactical air forces of countries surrounding us, even though they may be our allies. This is because FATAC draws its originality from three factors that are unique to it, its present role in deterrence, the variety of its utilization contingencies and its organization.

FATAC and Deterrence

In its offensive action, FATAC has a double capacity. It could engage the enemy by using conventional armaments--cannon attacks, bombings or rocketings--but in all circumstances it must be ready at all times to use its /nuclear weapons/ against the enemy forces, and this in case of special order from the head of state. This would mean a massive and powerful attack, in principle carried out in very close coordination with that of the Plutons. This double capacity, conventional and nuclear, explains the important role of FATAC in /deterrence/. Thus, in the eventuality where he seriously threatens our territory, the enemy would run the risk of triggering an effective reaction on his own forces which would use weapons of the same "nature" as those used to equip the SNLE's, the silos of the Albion plateau or the Mirage IV's. The weapons are of the same nature, let us note, but not of the same power, of the same range and not meant for the same targets. Such a nuclear attack constitutes an event of exceptional gravity, not only because of the degree of losses it is meant to make the enemy forces suffer but also because it unambiguously puts the enemy fact to face with the ultimate threat of our strategic nuclear forces.

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We are then at the heart of deterrence in which FATAC shows itself to be one of the essential components, especially if one takes into account the particular flexibility of utilization of the air arm in this domain, i.e., the variety of targets liable to attack by nuclear vectors which can reach from the contact lines to hundreds of kilometers inside enemy territory and the possibility of very rapid adaptation of the attacks to the actual situation, even if the axes of action of the enemy are found to be different from those initially discovered.

For this contingency FATAC sets up 4 nuclear squadrons--2 of which are equipped with Mirage III E's and 2 equipped with Jaguars--which have vectors of action ranging from 600 to 700 km flying at low altitudes and at great speed and which are capable of effecting their missions in "all weather" conditions, in other words independently almost of meteorological conditions. Each plane is capable of transporting a bomb of the order of 25 kilotons each, that is /of a force more powerful than the weapon which hit Hiroshima/. Simultaneously, in order to guarantee the "penetration" of nuclear planes, in other words to insure their safe passage in the face of enemy defenses, FATAC can set into operation other air formations in charge of accompanying the raid and consisting in some cases of planes specialized in electronic warfare and in others of planes equipped with air-ground missiles or other conventional weaponry.

Thus the preparation for the nuclear attack is the key element of all FATAC maneuvers in case of a major conflict in Europe. It is a question of conducting air operations in close coordination with the other forces while constantly evaluating the impact of "conventional" actions which turn out to be necessary on the conditions of a contingency nuclear engagement.

Lastly, the participation in the priority mission of /air defense of the territory/ and more precisely in the /protection of our strategic nuclear forces bases/ is still another aspect of the role played by FATAC in deterrence. This large command can in fact be induced to put under the operational control of CAFDA, at least temporarily, some of its fighting squadrons if the situation warrants that we reinforce the security of our strategic nuclear force. This role contributes to enlarge even more the extent--already very large--of the missions given to FATAC.

FATAC and the Variety of Its Utilization Contingencies

The fact that almost all its units are stationed in the northeast of France does not mean that FATAC is exclusively facing the traditional invasion zones of our territory. Its adaptation to the first army constitutes only one of its utilization frameworks. The mobility of its units, which has been mentioned earlier, the possibilities of their redeployment, and the flexibility of utilization of its air vectors make it that FATAC must be capable of operating with all or part of its means wherever the situation requires, in Europe or outside Europe. Its organization and the training of its units respond to this requirement. Thus the commander of FATAC has at his disposal, together with his two tactical commands (CATAC) and

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especially with the second CATAC, specific structures which allow for adaptation to a land command (other than the first army) or naval command in view of conducting operations using essentially conventional means in the case of a crisis which would be limited to a given sector of Europe (for instance, the Mediterranean front), or in case of overseas interventions.

In view of preparing itself for acting in such a framework in Europe, FATAc conducts or participates regularly in exercises the aim and the nature of which are very diverse: deployment exercises like the ones carried out in October 1975--Volt-Air--when 11 squadrons had been deployed in a matter of a few hours on 8 ground areas of the southwest and southeast of our country in the eventuality of a crisis in the Mediterranean; regular exercises of attack on boats at sea in cooperation with naval forces and departing from points to the south and to the west; larger interarms exercises such as the case of EXENTIA recently where the second CATAC--adapted to the 11th DP--had to conduct offensive air operations using several squadrons deployed in the west and southwest of our country.

Overseas the experience acquired in the last 2 years in Africa has brought out the determining role of our tactical air force in the conduct of operations. The time is no longer when one can intervene in such theaters using modest-performance engines. /Firepower/--and also the /speed of deployment and intervention/--have become /essential factors/ especially in the face of elements at once extremely mobile and most frequently solidly armed. There the muskets have given place to automatic weapons--oft n of high caliber--if not to missiles. With its Jaguars FATAc has within its power /the tool that is called for/, having made its mark. In-flight refueling is today a classic procedure used by all the Jaguar squadrons: this permits to make it nonstop to terrains situated at more than 700 km from the metropolitan bases. On the spot, it allows for very low altitude interventions on targets situated at more than 1500 km from the departure points. This extra range and the vectors' firepower answer the needs of the theater where precise and rapid action tactics prove to be capable of transforming radically a given situation. Finally, this same experience has permitted us to bring back to their just proportions the questions of logistics. The development of overseas aeronautical infrastructures as well as the logistic assistance that one can find in these theaters are in actuality favorable factors which one would do well to take into account.

FATAc and the First Air Region

The place of FATAc in the organization of the air arm constitutes the third originality of this great command. The command of FATAc is in effect fused with that of the first air region. The reason for it is that, as we have stressed, the near totality of FATAc units are stationed in time of peace on the territory of the first region. Thus we have here a case of specific organization "owed to circumstances" and not a rule in the air army.

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Nonetheless, one must stress the interesting aspect of such an organization. As a holder of territorial responsibilities, the FATAC command exerts its authority all at once in the realms of protection, defense and mobilization, in the domain of logistics and the infrastructure for everything that regards the aeronautical platforms constituted by the 14 airbases of the first air region, to which one must add also the deployment terrains. The fact that it disposes of both the forces and their support--general as well as specialized--is an appreciable trump card for forces that are the most susceptible to rapid and numerous redeployment actions. Having only one staff for dealing with both operational and territorial questions, the FATAC command can in effect work in optimal conditions of cost efficiency and with minimal delays. In particular, logistic maneuvers which are fundamental for the operational setting up of air units and bases are thereby facilitated. This is recently demonstrated at the occasion of the LOG 79 drills when after 9 days of intensive air activity and after having deployed more than half of its units--several times in the case of some units--FATAC ended up its maneuvers having a /fleet disponibility/ higher than at the beginning of the drills and /going well over 90 percent/. Such results are explained by the fact that there is a common command post organization in which all operational and territorial questions are decided by one and the same authority.

The fusion of FATAC and the first air region does not hamper, however, in any way the implantation of FATAC units in territories outside the first air region. Thus since the beginning of this year, a supplementary Jaguar squadron has been installed at Bordeaux-Merignac. While answering to FATAC on the utilization plane, this squadron is however put under the command authority of the third air region for all questions concerning territorial decisions. Here one goes back to the general organizational scheme of the air army.

The above considerations underline the variety of missions of the FATAC units--attacks both nuclear and conventional, reconnaissance and cover--and the variety of operational theaters in Europe as well as outside Europe. Faced with such a spectrum of missions, the number of units we have at our disposal may seem limited, especially if one takes into account demands which may be made upon some fighter squadrons since the beginning of the operations as they are needed for either a nuclear attack or for national air defense. It is thus a question of taking maximum advantage from these units, putting into use both their /utilization flexibility/ and their /capabilities/ while at the same time adopting in operational conduct a /style/ which befits the exigencies of the situation and corresponds to the possibilities of the means we use.

FATAC and Air Operation Style

To count on the utilization flexibility of air units means first of all to give oneself the possibility of /weighing the priorities/ of one mission against another in terms of the real situation and to concentrate the

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most means on one given action, at the opportune moment. The /polyvalence of FATAAC air units/, even if it is necessarily limited for self-evident reasons especially in terms of training and equipment, nonetheless does allow for such a shifting of efforts. As for the organization of FATAAC, which groups under one authority all tactical combat air units, it makes it possible thanks to the structure of its command posts, of its transmissions and control organisms, to maneuver its means in a manner well adapted to circumstances.

To play on the capacity of air vectors means to conceive of their use in function of their firepower--nuclear of course, but also the conventional type--and also in function of their "extended range," i.e., their capability for reaching targets that can be very far away. In this connection it is not useless to recall here that a Jaguar has a bomb-carrying capacity which is higher than that of a World War II B17 Flying Fortress, that it goes farther and at a speed one and a half times greater. It is not useless either to recall that 12 Jaguars or 12 Mirage V F equipped with rockets can deliver within a few seconds a firepower equivalent to that of 3 artillery regiments of 155mm shooting away during more than 5 minutes. Furthermore, this firepower can be delivered hundreds of kilometers away from the departure bases, at the price of a concentration expressed in terms of tens of minutes. These figures of course cannot be absolutely valid for all cases. But they clearly translate the firepower of our present tactical planes.

From the analysis of these factors one can deduct the style of our operations. The vocation of our tactical air force is thus /rapid, brutal and massive/ action so as to take maximum advantage of our intervention speed, of our concentration capabilities and of our firepower. It is the /"knock out blow"/ capable of overturning a situation if it is applied knowingly, there where it is needed and when it is needed. This is by definition true of the nuclear attack. It is also our aim in the case of conventional arms attacks the selective character of which must also be underlined. Such a style makes it imperative that all the means be concentrated in one single hand in order to achieve maximum effectiveness. It also makes it necessary to conceive of the air operations at a level where one must have a larger view of the situation and where one can consequently be sufficiently selective in the choice of targets and actions to be taken. It is at this price that our tactical air force will make its weight felt in the unfolding of operations.

In order to give more precision to this concept, it is not useless to present here some reflections on more specific problems which surface today in regard to FATAAC utilization, especially as it concerns the acquisition of air superiority and the evolving patterns of support.

Reflections on Superiority in the Air

The search for air superiority remains a must which conditions all the possibilities of maneuver of our forces, on land and in the air. One must,

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however, be more precise about the nature and degree of superiority that one strives for.

As we are dealing with offensive actions against enemy forces, superiority in the air which is limited in space and in time to the flight itineraries and duration of mission will have to be obtained by--if not more so--the quality of the vectors, by their penetration capacity, by the power of their electronic warfare equipment, and by the efficiency of their offensive and defensive weaponry as much as by their numerical superiority in the face of the enemy. This means that there is no reason for one to systematically abstain from all possibilities of offensive action by our tactical air forces and yield the action to the land forces in particular as long as superiority in the air has not been obtained as it has happened, for instance, in the World War II in which the superiority in the air was not acquired by the Allied Powers until 1944, i.e., after 3 years of fighting. In case of a major conflict in Europe, we would risk not even having that much time to obtain such a result.

In the realm of defensive action where it is a question of preventing enemy air forces in particular to bear down on our land forces--so that the latter can be guaranteed the necessary freedom of action needed for deployment and maneuver--the solution no doubt rests on /a tightly combined action by the ground-to-air artillery and by our air forces/. It is a question first of all of a meaningful cover based on our anti-aircraft artillery and our ground-to-air missiles. It is then a question of reinforcing this cover where and whenever the situation demands it with high speed fighter missions which would then be completed by offensive raids on the more threatening enemy terrains. There too, one must be selective. It is within this context that FATAAC disposes of several squadrons with the principal mission of hunting down other planes, that is seeking to destroy in flight the enemy planes.

In any case the cover air missions require /extremely close coordination between the land forces command and the FATAAC command/ whether it is a question of defining the moment and the zones where these missions must be launched or whether it is a question, in more general terms, of coordinating the actions of the air forces and those of the ground-to-air artillery. However complex they may be, these problems of coordination between the air and the ground-to-air artillery are not insurmountable as long as they are approached at the right level, that is at the level of adaptation of forces, taking into consideration the constraints of both forces involved.

Reflections on Air Support

Let us acknowledge that since the end of World War II and until the beginning of the 1970's, the questions of air support, at least as far as it concerns the operations in Europe, have for various reasons not been at the forefront of the news. Today these questions have taken on a singular importance not only in case of a major crisis in Europe, within the framework of maneuvers

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by our forces so that we can launch our tactical nuclear attack, but also in the case of more limited engagements in Europe or outside Europe which all require closely combined actions. The question is to know to which extent and how FATAc can nowadays perform such missions. This question comes up in the case of reconnaissance support and also and particularly in the case of conventional firepower support.

Regarding reconnaissance support, one cannot stress enough /the exceptional interest held by air reconnaissance/ which is capable of responding to the needs of the Air Force command. This means that it is capable at one and the same time to determine the penetration axes of the enemy and especially to effectively keep watch over the quasi-totality of all the possible zones of combat engagement of the enemy. In this regard, FATAc disposes of a very serious potential which counts not only the squadrons of the 33d reconnaissance fleet, nowadays equipped with Mirage III R's and scheduled for being equipped tomorrow with a specialized version of the Mirage F 1, but also the Jaguar squadrons the photo equipment of which has made its mark overseas. Finally one must add also that the reconnaissance capacities of FATAc are enlarged even as of now by the setting into operation of infrared and radar captors capable of working under all weather conditions besides the introduction of data processing in the information treatment systems (System Patricia).

If the form and nature of reconnaissance support are not subject to debate, the conventional firepower support on the other hand is often /the object of much debate/ as to the fashion in which it must be guaranteed today in terms of the performance capabilities of our modern planes. In the case of a major engagement in Europe, by the very nature of the air vectors and of their extended range and taking into consideration the probable overlapping of the first echelons at the first contact, it is clear that the elements of the second enemy echelon, the points at which they are obligated to go through and their logistics units would become the primary targets of the attacking planes of FATAc. There is no doubt that there is where the attacks would be at the limit of our planes and their possibilities. Nonetheless, it is our estimate that it would be totally abnormal if we are not organized to conduct actions "on the first echelon" of the enemy. This would be the case, for instance, where the head units of the enemy had dangerously thrown confusion in our troops and threaten to go around our positions; this could also be the case of a reverse hypothesis where our forces are well placed to conduct a decisive action but only if supported by particularly heavy firepower. The firepower of our present planes, already mentioned before, must then be taken into consideration: how can we not think of the addition of a formation of Jaguars or of Mirage III's capable of dropping more than 1500 rockets or nearly 40 tons of bombs in a few minutes? Given the necessarily selective character of this kind of missions, it will be a question here too of acting massively, at the right moment and at the right spot. All this goes to show that the "bit by bit support" given in small and scattered packages is a concept which yields very poor returns and therefore is to be eliminated, not only because such actions will be ineffectual but also because they would be extremely dangerous, leading to a useless erosion of our conventional combat potential. In any case whether it is a major conflict or a more limited

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engagement, the /possibilities of conventional support/ by the units of FATAAC under the form of mass actions for which they are being trained right now constitute one of the /essential elements/ of the conduct of operations.

Thus the tactical air force whose missions we have mentioned as well as the organization and also the main modes of action constitutes first of all an essential factor of our deterrence force. Its striking capacity, in firepower and in range, gives to our tactical nuclear weaponry as of now on the /dimension necessary/ for putting unambiguously an enemy that would seriously threaten our defense setup face to face with the ultimate risk of our /strategic reaction/. But our tactical air force is also a fighting tool destined to confront, most often within the framework of combined operations, other more diversified forms of threat. It owes its effectiveness to its mobility, its firepower and the range of its vectors, to the variety of missions that its units are capable of achieving, and to the strength of its logistic organization, in a word to its utilization flexibility.

The tactical air force is a perfectible fighting tool. The middle-range air-to-ground missiles which will be part of the equipment of its nuclear vectors and the development of data processing in mission preparation are bound to increase even more the capabilities of reaction of FATAAC and the possibilities of its utilization in the nuclear field. The development of new conventional weaponry which is at once more precise and capable of dealing with larger areas, an enlargement of the all-weather capabilities of the conventional reconnaissance and support planes, the strengthening of electronic warfare means and the continuation of efforts taken to protect both on the ground and in flight the departure bases constitute the great directions of efforts being done right now by the Air Force. They aim at enlarging even more the realm of action of the tactical air force and thus to reinforce its effectiveness.

Born on 4 May 1927 on Bouchard Island, General Forget entered the Air Academy in 1946. He became a fighter pilot and climbed all the echelons of combat air unit command from 1950 to 1965 when he quit the command of the second fighter fleet in order to go the Air War Higher Academy. Thereafter he commanded in particular Luxeuil Air Base (1969-71), then was named head of the Third Bureau of EMAA [Headquarters of the Air Armh]. Made brigadier general in 1974, he successively became second-in-command to the general commander of the Second Air Region, military chief of cabinet to the minister of defense, then second-in-command to the Commander of FATAAC-First Air Region (since December 1976). At the end of 1977 and the beginning of 1978, he was given important responsibilities within the framework of overseas actions. Named Air Force lieutenant general in November 1978, he has become commander of FATAAC-First Air Region since February of the same year. General Forget is a commander of the Legion d'honneur and holder of four citations of which three are Air Force citations. He has totalled more than 6100 hours of flight of which 1100 hours are on Mirage III's and Jaguars.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

ARIANE LAUNCHING SET FOR MID-DECEMBER

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 29 Sep 79 pp 29-30

[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Ariane Rocket's First Launch Between 8 and 18 December"]

[Text] In speaking to the 30th Congress of the IAF [International Astronautical Federation], in Munich, about the new European launch vehicle, Frederic d'Allest, CNES [National Center for Space Studies] Ariane program director, said the Ariane rocket's first flight is now scheduled between 8 and 18 December 1979. It will be recalled that at the start of the Ariane program (1973), the rocket's first qualification flight had been scheduled for mid-June 1979. It was subsequently postponed to early November, and then to late November-early December because of developmental difficulties with the third stage's cryogenic--liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen--propulsion system. Ariane is the first European rocket to use this cryogenic concept.

Ariane's first flight model (LO-1) was accepted by CNES on 12 September and shipped by sea to Kourou on 14 September. It is expected to arrive in French Guiana this week. Its preparation for launch will begin 1 October.

The three other qualification flights are scheduled in 1980--March (LO-2), June (LO-3), and October (LO-4)--with a total of five satellites to be placed in orbit (gratis): the German Firewheel scientific satellite and the German AMSAT-Oscar 9 amateur radio satellite by the LO-2, the Indian APPLE experimental communications satellite and ESA's [European Space Agency] Meteosat 2 geostationary weather satellite by the LO-3, and ESA's Marecs A maritime communications satellite by the LO-4. CNES plans to have the European launcher available for operational use by the first quarter of 1981.

Ariane Takes Over Space Shuttle Satellites

Frederic d'Allest revealed in Munich that an altogether new mission version of Ariane would be available during the first 3 years of

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operational use from 1981 to 1983. This mission version is very different from its predecessors and is marked by the appearance of a certain number of launches of non-European satellites that were to have been placed in orbit by the American Space Shuttle. But confronted with the difficulties encountered in the Shuttle's development and the substantial delays announced by NASA, authorities responsible for these satellites decided to take options with CNES and ESA so as to reserve the possibility of launching their satellites much sooner than with the Shuttle and at comparable costs.

For example, the Arab Space Communications Organization (ASCO) decided last week to take two options for the launching of its regional communications satellites, Arabsat 1 and 2, in 1982. Intelsat, the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, which had already approved one firm Ariane launch and taken an option on the launch of two Intelsat 5 satellites (No 5 and No 6 in April and July 1981 respectively), recently took a second option on another satellite launch (Intelsat 5 No 7) in July 1982. Intelsat is also currently negotiating with Europeans on a third option for the launching of the last satellite of the Intelsat 5 series (No 8) in December 1982 or January 1983.

In addition, on the basis of current negotiations with other users, CNES now lists a certain number of "potential" launches for such communications satellites as Western Union's (USA) Westar in 1981, the Indonesian Postal and Telecommunications Service's Palapa 1 and 2 in 1982, RCA's (USA) Comstar, and Telesat's (Canada) Anik D in 1982.

Then, of course, there are the new French satellites--Telecom-1A and 1B and SPOT [Earth Resources Observation Satellite]--and the new European satellites--Marecs B and C, ECS 1 and 2 [European Communications Satellite], Exosat [astronomy satellite], and Sirio 2 [propagation and communications experiments]. All of these French and European satellites have either already been approved or are in production. Other satellites in the planning stage will definitely be launched by Ariane, if their programs are approved. These satellites include ESA's Meteosat 3, France's TDF-1, Germany's TVSAT, etc.

CNES has compiled a list of 22 satellites to be launched by Ariane between early 1981 and early 1984. All are geostationary satellites except one scientific satellite, ESA's Exosat. Most are communications satellites. Of these 22 missions, 9 are firm, 4 are options, and 9 are "potential."

New Ariane Mission Model Launches

(F = firm, O = option, P = potential)

1981: Marecs B and Sirio 2: F; Intelsat 5 (No 5): F; Intelsat 5 (N06): O; Exosat: F; Westar: P;

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1982: ECS 1 and ECS 2: F; Telecom-1A: F; Arabsat 1 and Arabsat 2: O; Intelsat 5 (No 7): O; Palapa 1 and Palapa 2: P.

1983: Telecom-1B: F; TDF-1: P; Comstar, Anik D, Meteosat F3, Marecs C, and Intelsat 5 (No 8): P; Possibility of relaunch: P.

1984: SPOT F1: F.

Some of these missions are combined into a dual launch: Marecs B and Sirio 2, ECS 2 and Telecom-1A, Arabsat 1 and 2, and Palapa 1 and 2. This procedure permits remaining within the five Ariane firings per year limit allowed by the present facilities at the Kourou launch complex. But CNES plans to build a second Ariane launch pad at the Guiana Space Center by 1985 to increase the rate of Ariane firings and use the new versions of the European launcher (Ariane 2 and Ariane 3) whose production was approved by ESA this June. Frederic d'Allest said this new launch pad will also be designed to accommodate future versions (Ariane 4 and Ariane 5) capable of putting a payload of up to 10 tons into a low orbit.

The production of operational Ariane launch vehicles and their marketing are currently being handled on a provisional basis by CNES and ESA. Early next year, however, these tasks will be assigned to a new private company, ARIANSPACE, whose establishment is to be discussed at the next ESA Council meeting in October. Negotiations are expected to be successfully concluded by year's end.

The ARIANSPACE organization will include CNES and some 30 European manufacturers. Its proposed capitalization is 150 million francs.

F. d'Allest emphasized that Ariane is not an "interim" rocket but the first element in a "family" of European launch vehicles that will be able to compete with the American Space Shuttle in the course of the next 10 years.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

EFFECTS OF REORGANIZATION ON ARTILLERY NOTED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Sep 79 pp 18-19

[Article by Brig Gen Olivier de Gabory: "An Artillery at the Service of the Army Corps and the Division"]

[Text] As a previous article in ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI showed, the reorganization of the army structures has had repercussions on the artillery of the army corps. Indeed, it has become necessary to adapt the conditions of use and operation of the artillery, whose principles have not altered, to the new organization involving two levels of command instead of the previous three.

In this connection it is appropriate to recall, first, that in addition to the conventional ground-to-ground regiments of which everybody thinks spontaneously when artillery is mentioned one also finds ground-to-air regiments of several types as well as regiments of nuclear artillery in the army corps.

This being noted, it should be stressed right away that while for everything that concerns organization and everyday operations artillery regiments have been attached once more either to the army corps or to the division, the same is not true of their use.

Accordingly, on the organizational level, each division has only one artillery regiment now. All the other formations are organically part of the ACA [Army Corps Artillery] which has thus assumed great importance since the general commanding the ACA has directly under his orders about a dozen regiments or units making up a corps.

In contrast, as far as use is concerned, the position of the regiments either at the divisional level or at that of the army corps is not as rigid and can vary according to the needs of the tactical situation.

That is what we shall see in examining briefly the use of the artillery, successively at the level of the division and then at that of the army corps.

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A Single Regiment but Numerous Reinforcements per Division

In most of the tactical situations the general commanding the division was available, in addition to his organic ground-to-ground regiment, an additional artillery "unit" provided for him by the army corps. This addition can take the form either of a reinforcement of means or of a reinforcement of fire. In the first case a ground-to-ground regiment has been adapted by the army corps to the division and forms with the latter's organic regiment a grouping of two artillery regiments at the entire disposal of the division. In the second case the army corps causes the division to benefit from the reinforcement of a regiment's fire power or a group of several regiments of ground-to-ground artillery. As in the first case the division then benefits from the fire power of such a regiment or such a grouping while being absolved from any concern in the area of moving equipment and ammunition supplies.

As regards antiaircraft defense the division has no organic means of its own. But it benefits on one hand from the coverage assured by the Hawk missile regiment and soon by the Roland missile regiments of the army corps. On the other hand, one or exceptionally two operational ground-to-air units (double-barrelled 30-millimeter guns or Roland missiles) are placed under its operational control or are adapted to it.

Finally, the division participates in the use of tactical nuclear fire for which the army corps is responsible. It indicates the tactical targets of the moment suitable for Pluto missile launchers in the contact zones and makes suggestions to the army corps, notably for the determination, in its action zone, of a line of nuclear security not to be exceeded by friendly elements.

In order to undertake all these operations of the artillery, the general commanding the division organically has available a "deputy firemaster colonel" whose mission additionally covers the coordination of artillery fire with that of ALAT [Ground Forces Tactical Air Support] and the air force in the division's action zone.

Over-all Operations, Antiaircraft Defense, and the Use of Nuclear Artillery
Are up to the Army Corps

What is it that remains then in the hands of the general commanding the army corps when he has thus made some of his artillery units available to the divisions of the army corps?

As far as conventional ground-to-ground artillery is concerned, the army corps essentially continues to use over-all fire power. The command post of the army corps' ground-to-ground artillery, slated to have the means to hit targets in depth, directly triggering regiments not made available to the divisions whether they are organic to the ACA or of general reserve assigned to the army corps and also being in touch with the artillery

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regiments or groupings of the divisions, is in a position to bring about the concentration of sudden and massive fire, either in the interest of one of the divisions or on a target called for by the strategy of the army corps. The proximate entry into service of the new 155 AI FI self-propelled equipment with a range of up to 30 km will increase the capabilities of over-all operational fire by making it possible for the general commanding the army corps to direct his artillery fire through the entire breadth of the operational zone and to mark its successive efforts by their concentration at any point of his choice.

As far as antiaircraft defense is concerned, the army corps has its Hawk missile regiment available which is in a position to insure coverage at high, medium, and low altitude of the army corps' deployment. This general coverage is reinforced along the axes of principal air penetration or for the defense of certain routes or essential points of transit by light ground-to-air artillery regiments made up so far of 40-millimeter and 30-millimeter green batteries. The implementation now under way of the system of Roland missiles will make it possible to complete and extend at low and very low altitude the general coverage insured by the Hawk, especially in ground-to-air defense of advance formations charged with waging the battle.

Finally, the army corps uses tactical nuclear weapons of the Pluto regiments. The decision to use nuclear fire being a political act of the greatest importance, it is up to the army corps to order with precision the maneuver of the Pluto regiments and to assure itself of its rigorous execution so that, on one hand, the information of the higher decision-making authorities may be assured under optimal conditions and, additionally, so that the regiments should at all times be in a position to respond, as soon as possible, to the decisions of use of the head of state, transmitted and completed by the army.

As deputy firemaster of the general commanding the army corps, the commanding general of the ACA has as his role to back him in all matters relative to the use of conventional ground-to-ground and ground-to-air artillery units. He directs the fire power of these units as well as the use of the nuclear artillery regiments. These diverse operational responsibilities are not being independent of one another, it behooves the ACA commander to insure their coordination.

Thus, then, the reorganization of the structures of the large units involves a significant modification of the organic position of artillery regiments vis-a-vis the army corps and the division, but this reorganization has not occurred to the detriment of the division, contrary to the erroneous impression that some uninformed minds may have had of it.

It appears from an examination of the conditions of the use and operations of artillery that the division is not without artillery fire. The army corps which commands, supervises, and controls a large number of artillery

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regiments in peacetime does not retain, at the time of operations, the exclusive nature of their use. The division has available some of the capabilities or fire power of these regiments. The breakdown between the army corps level and that of the division is a function of the tactical situation. It is therefore fundamentally variable and the flexibility of artillery use becomes one of the essential characteristics of this weapon. Improved through the reorganization of the army structures which has just been effected, this flexibility will be increased further by the accrued performances of new equipment whose placement into service has just begun or is imminent.

Through the balancing of its capabilities and its fire power, the artillery, which has always been the weapon of deep fire penetration, powerful and constant, has acquired great flexibility of use for the benefit of both the division and the army corps.

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Brig Gen Olivier de Gabory, holding the certificate of advanced military studies, former student at the Center of Advanced Military Studies and at the Institute of Higher Studies of National Defense, took part with the 64th artillery group in the operations in Indochina from 1950 to 1952. He served in Morocco from 1953 to 1956 and participated in the operations in Algeria on two rounds of duty there (1958-59 and 1961-63). After commanding the 50th artillery regiment in Germany (1970-72), he served at army headquarters and in the office of the General Secretary of National Defense. A deputy commander now, he will assume the command of the artillery of the II Army Corps and of French forces in Germany as of 15 September 1979.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

DETAILS ON MTM 380, RTM 321 MILITARY HELICOPTER ENGINES

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 29 Sep 79 pp 20-21

[Article by J.M. "New Details on Turbomeca-MTU MTM 380 Engine for PAH-2 Antitank Helicopter and Rolls-Royce-Turbomeca RTM 321 Engine"]

[Text] Turbomeca-MTU MTM 380 Gas Turbine

A prototype of the gas generator for the MTM 380 gas turbine engine, developed jointly by MTU [Germany's Motoren und Turbinen Union GMBH] and France's Turbomeca, is scheduled to begin bench testing late this year. This new engine is designed to power the Franco-German PAH-2/HAC anti-tank helicopter. The engine's general characteristics were revealed at the 33d Paris Air Show, but more detailed information is now available.

A sectional view of the MTM 380 shows the following layout of components from left to right:

- a. Shaft drive connected to the upstream end of a shaft extending through the engine and terminating in the two-stage free turbine;
- b. Case supporting forward bearing and accessory gearbox (Turbomeca);
- c. Four-stage axial compressor; the two first rows of the stator vanes are adjustable; (Turbomeca);
- d. Centrifugal compressor capable of furnishing a high pressure ratio inasmuch as the announced total pressure ratio is 13; Turbomeca began testing this compressor in January;
- e. Annular reverse-flow combustion chamber, currently under development by MTU; a demonstrator model was exhibited at the Paris Air Show;
- f. Two-stage gas generator turbine; each stage is equipped with air-cooled vanes; turbine entry temperature in 1,400°K (1,127°C);

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g. Two-stage drive turbine developed, like f above, by MTU;

Turbomeca is responsible for development of the digital control system.

This engine is rated at 1,050 take-off shaft horsepower [shp]: 1,005 kw (1,370 shp) maximum contingency and 695 kw (950 shp) maximum continuous. It is characterized by its light weight (145 kilograms), modular construction, moderate take-off specific fuel consumption (222 g/hp/hr) even with partial loads, and its small overall dimensions (total length: 0.94 meter, maximum diameter: 0.45 meter). Mass air flow will be approximately 3 kilograms per second.

Definitive initiation of the MTM 380 development program now depends on signing of the PAH-2 program agreement by the French and German governments.

Rolls-Royce-Turbomeca RTM 321 Gas Turbine

It is now also possible to furnish additional details on the RTM 321 gas turbine. This engine has a takeoff power rating of 1,300 kw (1,776 shp). Rolls-Royce and Turbomeca propose to develop the engine jointly to meet such European requirements as:

a. Heavy ASW (antisubmarine warfare) helicopter: Westland WG34 SKR (Sea King Replacement); present plans call for a three-turbine helicopter with a total weight of about 12 tons;

b. Antitank helicopter: the PAH-2 is expected, of course, to be a twin-turbine model, but a single-turbine version would need an engine of the RTM 321's size;

c. Tactical transport helicopter

To a certain extent, the RTM 321 appears to be a possible successor to the Makila gas turbine and an answer to General Electric's T700 engine. This accounts for the interest shown in the RTM 321 project and indicates how important its official approval would be.

A sectional view of the RTM 321 illustrates its design similarity to the MTM 380. Like the latter, the RTM 321 also has a transonic (three-stage) axial compressor, followed by a centrifugal compressor, annular reverse-flow combustion chamber, a twin turbine that spins the gas generator's compressor, and a second twin turbine that powers the drive shaft (forward in the standard version).

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The power turbine will turn at 2,000 rpm (constant load) and the announced total pressure ratio is 14, a remarkable performance for a four-stage mixed-flow compressor. The announced distribution of work between Rolls-Royce and Turbomeca is slightly different, however, in that Rolls-Royce will be responsible for the combustion chamber, the high-pressure turbine, and the digital electronic control system subcontracted to Smiths Industries and the Dowty Group. Turbomeca will be responsible for the compressor, the power turbine, and the accessory gearbox.

The RTM 321's promoters point with pride at its light weight (total estimated weight, including equipment: 180 kilograms), low specific fuel consumption (228 g/hp/h at standard cruising power of 780 kw-1060 shp), compactness (length: 1.05 meters, diameter: 0.515 meter), and a degree of simplicity that ensures low production and maintenance costs. Also noteworthy is the engine's high rate of acceleration. Rolls-Royce and Turbomeca expect to get the "green light" for their project late this summer or early this fall. This would enable the first demonstration engine to be operating sometime during the first half of 1981.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

DISSENT WITHIN RED BRIGADES IMPLIES CHANGE IN TACTICS

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 24 Sep 79 p 66

[Text] She has dark, shiny hair, wears a blue shirt and khaki trousers: she is very pretty. He is also wearing khaki pants and resembles a young, absentminded professor. This is how they appear in photographs taken during their arrest. She is Adriana Faranda, a "brigatista" in charge of communications between the Red Brigades and other terrorist groups. He is Valerio Morucci, Rome's chief of the Proletarian Movement of Offensive Resistance and one of the leaders of the Red Brigades' "Roman Column." She is a 29-year-old Sicilian, the daughter of an attorney, he is a 30-year-old Roman.

When they were arrested on 30 May 1979, nobody realized immediately that a deep change was taking place in Italian terrorism: these two terrorists are "dissidents" from within the Red Brigades and were probably given away to the police by "orthodoxists" from their own organization. This was only the beginning of an internal war in which insults and words of hatred were to abound, ending with the "4 September Document." Terrorists must face these two phenomena: the crisis of the "armed party" on one hand; and the effectiveness of repression, on the other.

Effective Repression? At present 504 prisoners are waiting in Italian jails to be tried, 218 of whom are presumed to be members of the Red Brigades. Twenty four terrorist bases have been discovered. One found in Vescorio (Abruzzes) seems to have been Aldo Moro's detention place; the machine gun which killed the Christian-Democrat is presently being examined by magistrates. Finally, only last year, the police confiscated 344 automatic shot-guns, 54.4 revolvers, and over 11 tons of explosives.

Letters of Insult

"We are quite satisfied, we have succeeded in arresting the presumed killers of 89 people," declared the minister of interior. "If there were some errors, a matter on which our system of justice will decide, our democracy has not suffered in any significant way and we have not been compelled to adopt 'German type' measures, such as creation of a special 'leather head' unit. Of course, we do not claim victory. Nobody is able to say if we are through with terrorism." It is true that civil peace could result from effective methods of control and from internal strife among terrorist groups, but these factors may also lead to a new type of terrorism.

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The Red Brigades' crisis, which was first seen during the Moro incident, was confirmed this summer by an exchange of letters filled with hatred, insults and polemics worthy of Bakunin and Netchaiev. On one hand, we find the historical "core"--the founding fathers of the Red Brigades, presently in jail, who, with their leader Renato Curcio, are called "the gang of 17" in extreme left circles--which identifies itself with the new leadership of the Red Brigades. On the other hand, we find "dissidents" such as Morucci and Faranda, who signed their last manifesto on 4 September with a cartoon showing Curcio above the following caption: "We hang historical 'cadres' (meaning both painting and leader) on the wall." On one hand are the "registered" Red Brigades members, saying their orthodox rosaries; on the other are the "movementist" Red Brigades members, challenging the organization ideology and armed strategy of their leaders. We see partisans of the "armed party of guerrillas" against partisans of "armed spontaneity," Marxist-Leninists against anti-Marxists; "pro-politics" against "pro-economics;" purists of terrorism against terrorists filled with autonomist ideology.

Petty Men and Provocateurs

The exchange of letters began on 25 July with a first document from the "dissidents" On 31 July the Curcio answered. It called the "dissidents," such as Morucci, "little unprepared brains, neophytes, poor idiots manipulated by the counterrevolution, fastidious as mosquitoes in summer; gangs of petty men and provocateurs buzzing around the guerrilla." Then, mentioning the perspective of a "dictatorship led by the proletariat," it recalls that what counts for the original Red Brigades is to dismantle the state, attacking with weapons its vital political, economic and military centers.

"But is it the trial of Moscow," said Oreste Scalzone, one of the leaders of the autonomist group. He pronounced himself in favor of the "dissidents" in an open letter to Curcio published by the weekly "Panorama" on 27 August: "The Curcio gang takes itself for the vestal of proletarian revolution. Its document is typically Stalinist, worthy of the 'daguerreotypes from 1830' and of 'the horror museum of realized socialism,' but more important he ignores 'the new movement of social subversion,' represented by autonomy."

The dissidents respond to Curcio on 4 September. They are indignant: "From your jail you have a distorted, deformed and plainly reflected picture of the struggle of the classes;" you show "arrogance and presumption, what is central is the battle for satisfaction of needs" and it must be taken into account during the "next political-military winter campaign. The allusion to new 'needs' is proof of the rapprochement between the 'dissidents' and the 'autonomists.'"

The letters are not the only sign of the Red Brigades' crisis. We have learned that after officially expressing his disagreement with "the strategic leadership" of the Red Brigades, Morucci was put on trial and repressed by the organization. It appears that he was "suspended" for 2 months, that leaders sent an investigation team to his house which decided to make an inventory of his belongings and expropriate him. But Morucci, instead of obeying that

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decision fled with his belongings and continued his activities, such as the bombing of the Christian-Democrat's headquarters, and the assassination of the Christian-Democrat Councilor Schnettini.

To better understand the differences between "orthodoxists" and "dissidents" it is necessary only to listen to them speak. From the dissidents: "Enough of the orthodoxists' perfect technique, enough of outrageous enterprises--armed struggle must help to impose an adequate revolutionary program, responding to social needs expressed through struggles emerging from this decade. The proletariat fights for fewer working hours and for the benefits of services improving the quality of life." The refusal of work, and the theme of "needs" which characterize the ideology of the "autonomists" have become the "dissidents" guidelines. To this they add that the working class is no longer the "central subject for social transformation," and that it is being progressively replaced in its revolutionary role by students, outcasts, professionals and proletarianized persons.

This suggests a change in objectives for terrorists. "The armed struggle" must more and more adapt itself to problems and struggles of this new proletariat. For example, as explained in the 4 September document, instead of being satisfied by mass occupation of housing, a proletarian district must now be militarily defensible against the police.

No More Moro-Style Episodes

What can be expected the next terrorist enterprises will be? Many sociologists believe that "large-scale terrorism" Moro-style, is over with. "The only grand operation that the Red Brigades could conduct, they did with Moro. He was the only absolutely irreplaceable figure of Italian politics, because he represented the perfect combination between private image and public function," says Angelo Bolaffi. Others, such as Giulio Salieno, think possible "an outburst of numerous terrorist groups growing directly from repression," more familiar with "autonomists" analyses and more concerned with establishing ties to the struggles of the new proletariat.

Only one thing seems certain: whether large-scale terrorism is dead or not, whether or not it tends to come closer to "autonomists," cores of "diffused terrorism" exist to some degree everywhere, even taking the form of private vendettas and often deprived of any ideology. It is even less predictable and controllable than the fierce Marxist-Leninists from the Red Brigades and the anti-Marxists Morucci-Faranda style.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

FRAGA IRIBARNE CALLS ON ARMY TO COUNTERACT TERRORISM

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 14 Oct 79 pp 38, 39

[Text] Interview with Manuel Fraga Iribarne, leader of the Popular Alliance Party in Madrid, by Pedro Paramo: "Fraga: The Army Should Act"; date not given

[Text] Manuel Fraga Iribarne now is just a rank and file activist in the Popular Alliance Party (AP), but he still has his simple office in the party's headquarters in Madrid, just as if he were still its secretary general.

But despite his resignation from the AP's leadership, Fraga continues to be the most important spokesman of the Spanish right wing and his name is mentioned everywhere in times of crisis.

Manuel Fraga spoke with Pedro Paramo of CAMBIO 16 about the tensions caused by the assassination of military authorities in the Basque country, the army's role against terrorism and his own actions in case a military coup should occur.

[Question] Among the diagnoses of Spain's situation that have been made by distinguished military leaders, with which one would you agree more: that of a sick Spain or a dying Spain?

[Answer] I am totally opposed to the use of biological similes to describe social phenomena. But it is absolutely true that Spain is undergoing a crisis of state. Unfortunately, they happen in Spain more often than in other countries. Let us not call it sickness; let us just say that seldom has a generation faced so many problems.

[Question] Do you feel it is opportune and that it is not alarmist for three generals to make almost the same statement at this time, negatively judging the political transition?

[Answer] In my opinion, we must make a distinction between the different statements. In the first place, General Milans del

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Bosch's remarks were not made at that same time, but in July. According to the news I received, the statements were made to a semi-official magazine, RECONQUISTA, and to a reporter who is not at all suspect, that is, Maria Merida. In fact, considering how well I know and respect this military leader, I would suppose that his remarks were appropriate for the occasion.

Therefore, those opinions were given to a magazine whose purpose is to inspire military spirit and to a magazine that is very much inspired by religious themes. For example, in it pornography is discussed, among other things. This is very different from the context in which the remarks were published later.

By contrast, the statements of Lieutenant General Gabeiras, who evidently cannot be suspected of lacking the government's confidence (proof of this is that not long ago there was a question about how he was preferred over many other generals on the promotion list) cannot be interpreted as anything but a desire to satisfy the military audience that was listening to him.

And, in view of all of this, I feel that what happened was a quite natural unburdening of his feelings at a terrible moment. Colonel De Garellano had just been assassinated, as had the military governor-general of Guipuzcoa. These are no small matters.

The important thing right now is that no one can deny that the Army has accepted the Constitution and all of the changes. It has even accepted the statutes. What it can in no way accept is, first, separatism, which is clearly contrary to the Constitution. Neither can it accept the systematic killing of generals and leaders that is going on at this time.

Because at this moment, and I have already explained this (every one was shocked when I first used those words, but now everyone is saying it), this is not just any ordinary terrorism like that of the GRAPO (First of October Revolutionary Group). It is a revolutionary war. And you cannot get rid of a revolutionary war by saying "Let the police catch them."

To that end, neither the British in Ulster nor anyone else who has a similar problem fails to use all the means at their disposal. And it so happens that a country cannot exist under anarchy or systematic assassination or the threat of it. For each assassination that occurs in the Basque country is not merely a death. It is ten court secretaries who are saying: "I'm getting out of here because I am threatened." At this very moment, I think there are no customs officials at the border crossings.

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For this reason, the issue is very important. And since no one could think that this can go on, we must realize that in the end, action will be taken against the revolutionary war with the only available means, which are all of those at the disposal of the State, including military force.

Question Are you proposing military intervention in the Basque country?

Answer I did not say that the military should intervene. I am saying that it should be used constitutionally there, which is a different thing.

Question That is, the Army should enter that "revolutionary war..."

Answer At doesn't have to enter it. It is already there. What is happening is that its hands and feet are tied right now. I am talking about using the Army, and there are two ways to use it. One is in accordance with the Constitution, under the article regulating states of siege, according to which they may defend themselves in the defense of the Constitution and the State.

If, unfortunately, things reach the point where--through government weakness or the senselessness of some political groups--intervention must be carried out some other way, then, unfortunately, it would not act in favor of the Constitution, but against it, and that would be much worse.

I know that they answer that by saying: "That is what the terrorists want." Look, I don't know whether that is what the terrorists want, but in this case I would have to say they are right. For the problem, in effect, has reached the stage where the Basque society has been left defenseless and at this moment, any discussion, anything that is done through the combination of the terrorism of the ETA Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group and the street pressure tactics of Herri Batasuna's followers would be very dangerous for the future.

Question There are those who think that the use of the Army in the Basque country could be a trap similar to that laid for the British Army in Ulster. They have been fighting there for ten years and they have not solved the problem, and their casualties number not in the hundreds, but in the thousands.

Answer I disagree totally with that. Of course, the problem is that if the British had not sent their troops, Ulster would be much worse than it is now. Just as we will have to send them in any case, and the longer we wait, the worse it will be.

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On the other hand, I think you should rectify that idea of thousands, shouldn't you? Unfortunately, there are many fewer casualties in Ulster right now than there are here. Look at the statistics. At this moment. And just because the army is there.

[Question] It has been said recently that in case of a military coup, you might be called upon to lead or to participate in the government. Would you accept that job, even if it meant the suspension of the Constitution?

[Answer] Look, I have spent my life proposing political reform and everyone knows that. First I favored a liberalization during the previous regime, and now there is the Press Law. Then I favored a process of democratization.

I have also spent the last few years trying to explain to the Spanish people that reform is one thing and a total severing of continuity of the government is another terrible thing. It is plain to say that because there has been no reform, and things have been done as they have, based on amnesties and ill-considered statements, the result is that right now authority has collapsed; the mountains are aflame, the jails are a disaster of internal anarchy and terrorism has become independent in Bilbao and San Sebastian. And I think all of this could have been avoided.

I continue to be a reformist politician and for the same reason I definitely have never been for total solutions that occur because one group imposes its views on all the rest. That is what separates me from the people to the right of us. I have refused, in spite of all the pressure, to come to an agreement with other groups that call themselves national forces, a word that no one group can appropriate for itself.

But I have always said, too, that if the Spanish people must choose between a democratic Spain and a non-democratic Spain, it will choose--as it has chosen--a democratic Spain. But if they must choose between democracy and Spain, they will choose Spain. Of course, I understand that the situation, unfortunately, may become such that this option is raised. And I will do everything possible to see that it is not raised.

Therefore, in a word, I believe that the failure of all the politicians, including my own, may make that inevitable. But if it becomes inevitable, I will not be among those who tear their clothes. What I will do is simply retire to my home, not what Jose Maria Gil-Robles did for 20 or 30 years. I believe that if we must choose between Spain and democracy, it is better to choose Spain.

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Now then, I will do everything in my power to see that there is a democratic Spain.

I believe that Spain finds itself today in a situation that is similar to that which existed in France before 1958, when the military issued a warning there. At that time France could have taken the road toward a military dictatorship, but they had the good fortune that De Gaulle did not want to do that, and reformed the constitution.

I repeat, first of all, that if military action becomes inevitable, I will not be shocked. I will just go home. Secondly, I will do everything in my power to see that Spain does what France did in 1958, and not something else.

Spain really needs a 1958 today.

Question How is it that the Popular Alliance supported the Statute of Guernica in Congress and now it is asking for a vote against it?

Answer You should draw a distinction between the Democratic Coalition and its parliamentary group, and the Popular Alliance. The Popular Alliance has issued a statement about the set of circumstances surrounding the Statute and it has stated that that Statute--unlike the Catalanian one--does not even mention Spain, nor is the Statute mentioned as a way to build Spain.

Furthermore, an interpreter as important as Mr Garaicochea himself commented, a few days after the approval of the Statute, which is, let us say, enormously advanced: "Good, this is a step toward a future confederation." Listen, then, we are going to talk about this again.

We must consider, first, that the text of the Statute is unsatisfactory. Secondly, we must take the interpretation given to it by the very people who defend it, and lastly, it turns out that there is a group of men there who are saying: "No, we must not lay down our arms."

So, what with all of this, the AP has reached the conclusion that it should have recommended a vote against it, and this is compatible with what happened before.

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